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DO MUNICIPALITIES HAVE ARTICLE III
STANDING TO SUE MORTGAGE LENDERS UNDER
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT?
Samuel Marll
INTRODUCTION
“I believe when somebody owns their own home, they’re realizing the
American Dream.”1
By 2008, the U.S. housing market had veered off a cliff.2 Along with
it went many Americans’ life savings, cities’ tax bases and any realistic
hope of a speedy macroeconomic recovery. As the financial contagion
spread and layoffs arrived in force, millions of taxpayers residing in
metropolitan areas faced the twin specters of foreclosure and eviction.
Inner city rot only deepened as foreclosed-upon and vacant homes gave rise
to higher crime rates and intensified the strain on cash-strapped public
welfare agencies.
Battered by waves of foreclosures and desperate for relief, four cities
brought suit in federal court against the largest mortgage lenders and



J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2013. B.A. Economics,
Gettysburg College, 2008. The author would like to thank Professor Theodore W. Ruger for
his supervision and advice, and the editorial staff of the Penn Journal of Business Law for
their diligent efforts. Special thanks go to my family and friends for their support during the
comment-drafting process, and in particular, Michael Marll, Kyle Rhood, and Thane
Schweyer.
1. President George W. Bush, Address to HUD Employees on National
Homeownership Month (June 18, 2002), http://archives.hud.gov/remarks/martinez/speeches
/presremarks.cfm.
2. See Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, National Composite Home Price Index for the
United States, FRED ECONOMIC DATA (last updated Nov. 28, 2012, 8:32 AM),
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USCSCOMHPISA?cid=32261 (observing the
dramatic fall in home prices between 2006 and 2008); Bob Brundage, Real Estate: More
Homes in Nevada Underwater Than Anywhere in U.S., RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Mar. 13,
2011, available at BIZ, available at 2011 WLNR 4970992 (stating that sixty-five percent of
all Nevada mortgages were underwater, followed by Arizona at fifty-one percent, Florida at
forty-seven percent, Michigan at thirty-six percent, and California at thirty-two percent).
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securitizers.3 Three cities allege that Citigroup and Wells Fargo violated
the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, by using “reverse
redlining” techniques to target minority borrowers with subprime mortgage
products. These loans were purportedly aimed at minority borrowers to
maximize the principal, interest, and fees that could be extracted from
prospective homeowners who had neither the wherewithal to repay the
loans nor the financial literacy to understand the transactions. Once the
housing bubble popped and the U.S. labor market went into free fall, the
ensuing mortgage defaults and foreclosures resulted in vast urban dead
zones of vacant, crumbling houses.
The cities allegedly suffered two distinct injuries from lenders’ reverse
redlining. First, the mass foreclosures resulted in sizable reductions in
property tax receipts, shrinking already-limited municipal budgets.4
Second, the now-empty housing units became prime fodder for drug
dealers, squatters and other criminals.5 In response, the cities were forced
to divert scarce law enforcement resources to continually patrol and
investigate abandoned properties.6 Even without the resulting spike in
crime rates, the vacant units required constant maintenance and fire safety
inspections. These ongoing risks imposed onerous fiscal burdens on cities
already struggling to provide basic services to their residents. The cities
alleged that but for the lenders’ discriminatory lending practices, neither
the loss of property tax receipts nor the increased expenditure on crime
control and infrastructure maintenance would have been necessary.7
The lenders responded to this initial salvo of complaints with a
barrage of motions to dismiss for lack of standing.8 They argued that
3. City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123123 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief & Damages, City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857STA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Memphis
Complaint]; Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief & Damages, Mayor of
Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847 (D. Md. 2010) (No. JFM 108—
CV-00062); Second Amended Complaint, City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec.,
Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (No. 1:08-CV-139).
4. Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 140(a) (alleging that Wells Fargo’s reverse
redlining caused loss of property tax revenue); Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory &
Injunctive Relief & Damages ¶ 320, Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
JFM-08-62, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Baltimore 3d
Complaint] (seeking damages for lost property tax revenues).
5. Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 142.
6. Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 119-308.
7. E.g., id. ¶¶ 97-108 (alleging that but for Wells Fargo’s racially motivated steering
of customers into subprime loans, “borrower[s] would have continued to make payments on
the mortgage and remained in possession of the premises”).
8. E.g., Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint at 6, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
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neither reductions in tax revenue nor increased spending on municipal
services qualified as cognizable injuries-in-fact for Article III standing
purposes.9 Even conceding that these economic losses constituted
actionable harms, the causal chain connecting any purportedly illegal
mortgage practices and the resulting urban blight was too attenuated. That
is, the cities’ harms were not fairly traceable to the lenders’ conduct, and
the injuries were too derivative of those sustained by third parties (i.e., the
foreclosed-upon homeowners).10 Thus, the lenders concluded, the plaintiff
cities were not the proper parties to bring suit. District courts in Alabama,
Maryland, Ohio, and Tennessee have decided these motions in mixed ways.
These motions to dismiss have been met with mixed success in district
courts in Alabama, Maryland, Ohio and Tennessee.
This Comment analyzes whether municipalities possess Article III
standing to sue mortgage lenders in federal court for FHA violations.
Starting with a quick primer on reverse redlining and its economic impact, I
move into a literature review. I argue that, contrary to existing literature,
cities lack constitutional standing to sue under the FHA. I reach this
conclusion based on comparisons to the tobacco and handgun litigation
from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Using a framework
for causation drawn from the antitrust and RICO contexts, I determine that
courts should grant lenders’ 12(b)(1) motions. I conclude with the
implications for municipalities, both as marginal actors in a federalist
system and in the immediate wake of the national mortgage settlement
between the large banks, federal government and state attorneys general.
A. Economic Backdrop of the Reverse Redlining Problem
“You will love this place. There are no Black people here.”11

No. JFM-08-62, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 62 (D. Md. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Standing doctrine
requires the City to allege a plausible connection between specific loans and the vacancies
to which the City traces its injuries.”).
9. E.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *6 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011) (acknowledging that Wells Fargo
challenges only the causation and injury-in-fact prongs of the constitutional standing
inquiry).
10. E.g., Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at n.9, City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc.,
No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 446523 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 6, 2009) (alleging
that any causal connection between Birmingham’s injuries and Citigroup’s conduct was
broken by a third party’s independent action).
11. Protecting the American Dream (Part II): Combating Predatory Lending Under
the Fair Housing Act Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 88 (2010)
(statement of Thomas Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice)
(describing one realtor’s statement to an undercover “tester” for HUD).
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This Comment focuses on a particular subset of predatory lending that
became rampant during the bubble years, known as “reverse redlining.”
The practice consists of “offering high-priced mortgage loans to non-white
‘house-rich but cash-poor’ consumers,” on more punitive terms relative to
those offered to Caucasian borrowers.12 Lenders “specifically target and
aggressively solicit minority, elderly and low-income homeowners who
have traditionally been denied access to mainstream sources of credit.”13
The extent to which reverse redlining may have permeated the U.S.
mortgage market over the last few decades is staggering. 14 As the ongoing
foreclosure crisis continues to expose significant levels of race-based
lending in urban areas, it is only in the last few years that regulators have
begun to address the degree to which racial prejudices infected the major
banks’ lending policies.15 Wholly separate from the destabilizing effects on

12. William Apgar, Assistant Sec’y for Hous. & Fed. Hous. Comm’r, Dep’t of Hous. &
Urban Dev., Testimony Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services
(May 24, 2000) (transcript available at http://archives.hud.gov/testimony/2000/524apgar.cfm); see also United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 203 n.5
(D. Mass. 1998) (defining reverse redlining as “the practice of extending credit on unfair
terms” to minority communities); Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space:
Concentrated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94. CAL. L. REV. 101, 102 n.9
(2006) (defining reverse redlining as “the targeting of persons for credit on unfair terms
based on their income, race, or ethnicity.”).
13. Apgar, supra note 12.
14. Segregation as a Driver of Subprime Lending and the Ensuing Economic Fallout:
Comments Before the Joint Economic Comm., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Gregory
D. Squires, Professor, George Washington Univ.) (relying on HMDA data to conclude that
at the peak of subprime lending in 2006, 53% of African American borrowers in nonwhite
communities received subprime loans, compared to 46% of Hispanics and 22% of whites);
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Unequal Burden: Income and Racial Disparities in
Subprime Lending, HUD ARCHIVES (Apr. 2000), http://archives.hud.gov/reports/subprime/
subprime.cfm (noting that in 1998 fifty-one percent of home loans in predominantly black
neighborhoods were subprime, compared to nine percent in predominately white areas).
15. See, e.g., Written Agreement Between Wells Fargo & Co. and Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, Docket Nos. 11-094-B-HC1, 11-094-I-HC1, 11-094-B-HC2 & 11-094I-HC2 (July 20, 2011) (assessing an eighty-five million dollar civil money penalty against
Wells Fargo for improperly steering prime borrowers toward subprime loans); Jo Ann
Barefoot & Andy Sandler, Red Alert on Redlining: Renewed Attention Plus Crisis Aftermath
Stir Up Major Trouble for Banks, ABA BANKING JOURNAL, Mar. 2011, at 34 (noting that
“banking agencies have made more than 40 fair-lending referrals over the past two years” to
the Justice Department which “has announced four fair-lending settlements” for, among
other things, “redlining and charging higher rates and fees . . . to members of protected
classes”); Brent Kendall, Victims Sought in Countrywide Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2011,
at C3 (announcing the Justice Department’s $335 million settlement with Countrywide that
resolved allegations that Countrywide charged higher fees and interest to African American
and Hispanic borrowers between 2004 and 2008); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Financial
Fraud Enforcement Task Force Announces Settlement with AIG Subsidiaries to Resolve
Allegations
of
Lending
Discrimination
(Mar.
4,
2010),
http://ww
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financial markets, reverse redlining may have entrenched existing patterns
of racial distribution across metropolitan areas.16 Worse, decades of
agonizing economic progress for African Americans have been undone as
the mortgage market’s contraction continues apace, with the credit crunch
disproportionately harming minority access to conventional banking
channels.17
However, the purpose of this Comment is not to educate the reader on
the evils of reverse redlining and the deleterious effects that predatory
lending has on the social fabric.18 Other authors cover that topic, and in

w.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crt-226.html (stating that two AIG subsidiaries agreed
to pay $6.1 million “to resolve allegations that they engaged in a pattern of or practice of
discrimination against African American borrowers”); Tracy Russo, Enforcement of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, THE JUSTICE BLOG (Apr. 12, 2011), http://blogs.usdoj.gov/
blog/archives/1292 (announcing formation of fair lending unit in Justice Department’s
Housing and Civil Enforcement Section).
16. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, A COMMENT ON BANK OF
AMERICA/COUNTRYWIDE’S DISCRIMINATORY MORTGAGE LENDING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR RACIAL SEGREGATION 3 (Jan. 3, 2012) (warning that reverse redlining could have
“reinforced, and may even have intensified, racial segregation in our major metropolitan
areas”).
17. Christine Dugas, ‘Dual System’: Minorities Lose Financial Ground, Critics Say,
USA
TODAY
(last
updated
Apr.
5,
2011,
5:20:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/general/2011-04-04-real-estate-financialdiscrimination.htm (noting that the “overall share of conventional prime mortgage lending
in communities of color fell 35%, while the share of loans to predominantly white
neighborhoods increased 11%”); Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Delinquent
Debt Shrinks While Real Estate Debt Continues to Fall (Feb. 27, 2012),
http://data.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research/2012/an120227.html (noting that
mortgage and home equity lines of credit continued to fall, dropping $146 billion in
2011:Q4).
18. I take care to note that subprime lending and predatory lending, which includes
reverse redlining, are not coterminous. While plenty of overlap exists between the two, they
are conceptually distinct. HUD and Treasury define predatory lending as “engaging in
deception or fraud, manipulating the borrower through aggressive sales tactics, or taking
unfair advantage of a borrower’s lack of understanding about loan terms.” Predatory
Mortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. n.19 (2001) (testimony of Thomas J.
Miller, Att’y Gen., State of Iowa). One California court characterized predatory lending as
“a range of abusive and aggressive lending practices, including deception or fraud, charging
excessive fees and interest rates, making loans without regard to a borrower’s ability to
repay, or refinancing loans repeatedly over a short period of time to incur additional fees
without any economic gain to the borrower.” Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104
P.3d 813, 815 (Cal. 2005). Victims tend to be “homeowners who frequently cannot pay the
associated costs and therefore lose their homes.” Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback,
City Governments and Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 757 (2007).
Contrast this with legal subprime lending, which merely consists of offering mortgages “to
people who represent a higher level of risk than borrowers who meet standard prime
underwriting guidelines.” KENNETH TEMKIN ET AL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, SUBPRIME
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greater detail than here.19 My interest lies with local governments’
disparate attempts to contain the fallout created by lenders’ racial practices.
In the next section, I describe cities’ efforts to stanch the fiscal
hemorrhaging.
B. Cities’ Resort to Litigation in the Federal Courts
“Subprime loan officers described African-American and other
minority customers by saying ‘those people have bad credit’ and ‘those
people don’t pay their bills,’ and by calling minority customers ‘mud
people’ and ‘niggers.’ They referred to loans in minority communities as
‘ghetto loans.’”20
In response to the loss of property tax revenue and increased
municipal spending perceived to be a byproduct of lenders’ reverse
redlining tactics, four cities filed civil suits in federal court against
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Citigroup, and Wells Fargo.21 Three
complaints allege FHA violations, along with state law claims under
consumer protection statutes and common law.22 The fourth complaint,
filed by the City of Cleveland, targeted mortgage-backed securities issuers
under a common law public nuisance theory of liability.23
The cities did not allege that the lenders or securitizers engaged in
direct racial discrimination against them.24
Instead, Baltimore,
MARKETS, THE ROLE OF GSES, AND RISK-BASED PRICING 4 (Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.
2002).
19. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the
Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 164, 169-75 (2009) (discussing reverse redlining practices and
their impact on municipalities and communities of color); Brett Altier, Note, Municipal
Predatory Lending Regulation in Ohio: The Disproportionate Impact of Preemption on
Ohio’s Cities, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 125, 129-34 (2011) (describing predatory lending and
its economic impact).
20. Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 56 (citation omitted).
21. See supra text accompanying note 3.
22. Id.
23. See City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 615 F.3d 496, 498-99 (6th
Cir. 2010) (discussing the complaint filed by the city of Cleveland).
24. E.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 207-08 (1972) (“The
complaint alleged that the owner had discriminated against nonwhite rental applicants in
numerous ways, e.g., making it known to them that they would not be welcome . . .
manipulating the waiting list for apartments, delaying action on their applications, using
discriminatory acceptance standards, and the like.”); Stevens v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend,
Ind., 663 F.3d 300, 303 (7th Cir. 2011) (alleging that defendants violated the Fair Housing
Act by “locating her publicly-funded apartment building in a primarily African-American
neighborhood, [and] segregating her on account of race”); Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in
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Birmingham, and Memphis each alleged that Citigroup and Wells Fargo
engaged in reverse redlining against their taxpayers in violation of the Fair
Housing Act.25 Relying on statistical data, the cities argued that African
American residents were targeted with subprime loans at rates much higher
than those of financially comparable Caucasian borrowers.26 The cities cite
testimony of former loan officers who describe employee incentive
programs for targeting ostensibly less-sophisticated minority borrowers
with toxic mortgage products.27 Black homeowners were saddled with
mortgages that had interest rates, fees and other conditions that made the
loans more onerous than prime mortgages.28 These race-based steering
practices were allegedly accompanied by campaigns of out-and-out
deception on the part of lower level employees.29 These high-cost loans
were disproportionately located in African American neighborhoods in
Baltimore, Birmingham, and Memphis.30 The time between default and
foreclosure on delinquent mortgages owed by African Americans was
especially quick compared with the experience of white borrowers in
delinquent mortgage situations.31 As a result of the banks’ illegal lending
practices, an “excessive and disproportionately high number of foreclosures
in African-American neighborhoods” resulted once the housing sector’s
Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mt. Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011) (asserting that the township’s
redevelopment plan discriminated against minorities, violating the Fair Housing Act).
25. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011) (asserting that Wells Fargo
targeted African American mortgage borrowers); Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 849 (D. Md. 2010) (noting the city’s assertion that “Wells
Fargo . . . target[ed] the City’s underserved and vulnerable minority neighborhoods . . . ,
causing an increase in abandoned and vacant homes in those areas”).
26. See City of Memphis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *3 (noting that “41% of
Wells Fargo loans resulting in foreclosures occurred in African-American neighborhoods,”
compared to only 23.6% of foreclosures occurring in predominantly white neighborhoods).
27. See, e.g., Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 101) (describing “large commissions
and bonuses of up to $10,000 a month for meeting Wells Fargo’s quotas for subprime
loans”); see also Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 59 (alleging that bank
representatives made more money in referral fees by sending borrowers to subprime loan
officers, creating a system that paid out “‘bounties’ on minority borrowers”).
28. See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 96 (alleging that Wells Fargo’s
lending practices pushed borrowers to take out loans “more onerous than loans for which
they qualif[ied]”).
29. See, e.g., Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶¶ 111-16 (alleging that Wells Fargo
ordered employees to mislead customers about closing costs, fees, adjustable rates, size of
mortgage payments, prepayment penalties and other terms and conditions).
30. See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶¶ 72, 74 (showing, through Wells
Fargo’s own data, that Wells Fargo issued high-cost loans to forty-three percent of African
American customers in Baltimore, particularly in certain historically black neighborhoods).
31. Id. ¶ 89 (alleging that there is an approximately sixty-five day difference between
average time of foreclosure for white borrowers and for black borrowers).
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implosion triggered a broader economic decline.32 As a result, the cities
suffered reductions in property tax receipts on vacant housing units and
were forced to increase spending on the municipal services required to
combat accelerated urban decrepitude.33
In response, the lenders moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1),
alleging the municipalities lacked Article III standing to sue.34
Birmingham and Cleveland saw their complaints dismissed due to standing
and proximate causation problems.35 Baltimore survived Wells Fargo’s
12(b)(1) motions only after repeatedly amending its complaint to satisfy
constitutional standing requirements. Memphis also withstood Wells
Fargo’s 12(b)(1) motion after modeling its complaint on Baltimore’s.36
Clearly, potential exists for lenders to escape liability for reverse redlining
violations via this attack on the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to hear
the case. Depending on how courts choose to resolve the city standing
issue, municipalities may be barred from seeking judicial redress for
damage sustained as a result of lenders’ illegal practices.
Furthermore, given the recent mortgage settlement between federal
regulators, the state attorneys general and the largest mortgage lenders,
claims under the FHA may prove to be invaluable in undoing the harm
inflicted on cities and taxpayers by reverse redlining.37 The national
32. Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 4.
33. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 142-45 (describing harms caused by vacancy, including “squatters,
increased risk of crime and fire, and infrastructure damage such as burst water pipes and
broken windows” as well as environmental issues, all of which require expensive “police
and fire calls and housing code enforcement efforts”).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) (stating that a party may assert lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction as a defense to a claim for relief).
35. See City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123123, at *13 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009) (holding that “the City does not have
standing to pursue any of these claims against the Defendants”); City of Cleveland v.
Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 536 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (finding that
because “the allegations [are] . . . insufficient to establish proximate causation, the City’s
public nuisance claim fails as a matter of law”); Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss ¶ 14-21,
City of Birmingham v. Citigroup Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44652
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (arguing that Birmingham failed to allege a cognizable injury-in-fact that
is fairly traceable to Citigroup).
36. See City of Memphis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48522, at *16 (noting similarities
between the Memphis, Baltimore and Birmingham suits); id. at *52 (denying Wells Fargo’s
12(b)(1) motion).
37. On March 12, 2012, the Justice Department, HUD, and forty-nine state attorneys
general filed with the District of the District of Columbia a set of consent judgments with
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Wells Fargo, Citigroup, and Ally Financial amounting to
approximately twenty-five billion dollars in financial relief for borrowers and monetary
sanctions. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicing Agreement
Filed
in
Federal
Court
(Mar.
12,
2012),
available
at
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Settlement-USDOJ-FILING-news-release.pdf.
The
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settlement with Ally/GMAC, Bank of America, Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and
Wells Fargo bars both state and federal regulators from bringing a wide
range of civil claims against the lenders, including, but not limited to, “any
civil or administrative claim, of any kind whatsoever, direct or indirect, that
an Attorney General or [state mortgage] Regulator, respectively, has or
may have or assert, including, without limitation, claims for damages,
fines, injunctive relief, remedies, sanctions, or penalties of any kind . . . .” 38
However, despite the broad language of the releases, they appear confined
to state and federal entities, and not local governments.39 Direct suits by
the cities against the banks may represent a substantial opportunity to
extract compensatory damages from these financial institutions.
This Comment addresses the question of whether cities have Article
III standing to pursue FHA claims against lenders for reverse redlining. I
conclude that cities do not have standing to sue under the FHA, due to
difficulties with satisfying the “fairly traceable” component of the standing
inquiry necessary to sue in federal courts.40 I begin with a brief review of
the existing literature on this subject. The consensus is that actions under
the FHA comprise a viable means of achieving restitution for harms
sustained by cities as a result of lenders’ racially motivated lending
practices. However, much of the literature predates the first wave of
settlements include “a broad release of the banks’ conduct related to mortgage loan
servicing, foreclosure preparation, and mortgage loan participation services.” PHILIP A.
LEHMAN, NORTH CAROLINA DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MULTISTATE/FEDERAL
SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS 4
(2012), available at
https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/NMS_Executive_Summa
ry-7-23-2012.pdf. Importantly, “[c]laims based on these areas of past conduct by the banks
cannot be brought by state attorneys general or banking regulators.” Id.; see, e.g., Consent
Judgment at G-5, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-RMC
(D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Consent_Judgme
nt_BoA-4-11-12.pdf (releasing Bank of America from liability for various types of potential
civil claims made by states). However, the terms of the settlement specifically provide that
the release does not extinguish either claims arising out of fair lending laws or any claims by
county and local governments. Id. at G-9.
38. Id. at G-5. Similar consent judgments with JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo have
been filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The settlement requires the
lenders to pay five billion dollars in cash to the federal and state governments, plus twenty
billion dollars toward “various forms of financial relief to homeowners,” including principal
reductions on underwater mortgages and loan refinancings. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, $25 Billion Mortg. Servicing Agreement Filed in Fed. Court (Mar. 12, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/March/12-asg-306.html.
39. Consent Judgment at G-9, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:12-cv00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), available at https://d9klfgibkcquc.cloudfront.net/Cons
ent_Judgment_BoA-4-11-12.pdf.
40. While a few municipalities have brought suit against lenders in state court, this
Comment does not address the ability of cities to sue in state court because the rules for
standing to sue in state court vary by jurisdiction.
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municipality-sponsored FHA litigation. This Comment is poised to draw
new insights from the recently completed initial round of city-lender
litigation. Existing literature disregards the “fairly traceable” element of
the standing inquiry. Akin to a highly informal proximate causation test,
standing law requires that the plaintiff allege injuries that can be “fairly
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct. Much of the existing literature
glosses over this requirement, rendering it a formality in the pleadings.
Extending an analytical framework from the antitrust and RICO contexts
for economic losses, I argue that the multitude of independent causal
factors between any reverse redlining and eventual fiscal harm to the
municipality renders it impossible for city-plaintiffs to satisfy this element
of the standing test. As such, courts should dismiss FHA actions instituted
by cities on this theory of liability.
First, I summarize the existing literature on this topic and the
conclusions other authors have drawn. I rule out the possibility that cities
can sue in parens patriae. I then delve into the standing analysis.
Conceding that the economic losses sustained by cities constitute
cognizable injuries-in-fact and that a favorable judicial decision would
provide adequate redress, I make my stand on the “fairly traceable”
component. I conclude with preemptive counter-responses to those who
would argue that the cities possess constitutional standing, and ruminations
on what this means for foreclosure-wracked municipalities going forward.
I.

LITERATURE REVIEW

“Where a city can demonstrate that lenders have deceived borrowers
into accepting loans on terms that they could not afford and, as a result,
the borrowers lost or could not maintain their homes, resulting in reduced
tax revenues and increased demand for city services, a court could find that
the city‘s injuries were ‘fairly traceable’ to the predatory lending.”41
In this section, I conduct a brief overview of the literature on
municipalities’ Article III standing to pursue various types of claims in
federal court, including under the Fair Housing Act, state consumer
protection statutes and common law public nuisance.
Most of the literature on the subject acknowledges, albeit briefly, the
notion that cities must first establish standing to sue predatory lenders.42
41. Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of
Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 376 (2006).
42. E.g., David D. Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 21, 27
(2010), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/123forum_troutt.pdf (noting that
“[c]ities suing lenders in their own capacities face federal standing hurdles on parens
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However, several existing publications predate the city-sponsored litigation
arising out of the 2008 financial crisis.43 Kathleen Engel’s 2006 article
focuses primarily on “whether cities have standing to recover damages for
the externalities that predatory lenders impose on them and whether cities
have standing as parens patriae to protect the interests of their residents.” 44
After a short introduction of the threshold issue of standing, Engel moves
quickly to consider whether cities can institute parens patriae suits to
remedy harms suffered by a large segment of the resident population.45
This includes a brief discussion of the separate elements required to
establish parens patriae standing: (1) quasi-sovereign interests in the
public welfare vindicated by the suit, (2) numerosity of citizens harmed by
the defendant’s alleged behavior, and (3) an interest in the controversy
wholly distinct from that of private parties involved in the action.46
The author notes that the lower federal courts have securely locked the
courthouse doors to cities seeking to sue as parens patriae, observing that:
[t]he federal courts have unequivocally held that political
subdivisions cannot bring claims as parens patriae because their
power is derivative, not sovereign. Thus, cities bringing claims
as quasi-sovereigns in federal court or whose claims as quasisovereigns are removed to federal court are certain to face
dismissal . . . . [T]he federal courts have made it clear that they
will not grant cities quasi-sovereign standing.47
Engel then briefly discusses the possibility of filing suit in state court as a
means of escaping the federal courts’ heightened standing requirements.48
Having established the futility of bringing federal derivative actions on the
taxpayer’s behalf, Engel also addresses the hurdles to proprietary litigation
against mortgage lenders in federal court that are posed by Article III
standing doctrine.
Engel’s analysis focuses primarily on injury-in-fact and conduct fairly

patriae grounds” and “cities are often denied standing to sue in federal court”).
43. E.g., Kyle Cutts, Comment, City on the Brink: The City of Cleveland Sues Wall
Street for Public Nuisance, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1399 (2008) (gauging the likelihood of
success of Cleveland’s then-pending public nuisance lawsuit, including potential standing
and proximate causation barriers to recovery); Frank Lopez, Note, Using the Fair Housing
Act to Combat Predatory Lending, 6 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 73, 94 (1999) (noting
that the FHA’s lax prudential standing requirement, which “extend[s] to the full reach
permitted by the Constitution,” may prove to be the most viable method for combating
reverse redlining).
44. Engel, supra note 41, at 355.
45. Id. at 362.
46. Id. at 361-65.
47. Id. at 365-68.
48. Id. at 366-68.
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traceable to the defendant’s actions. She validly observes that “[w]hen
predatory lending leads to abandoned and neglected homes, cities
experience declines in tax revenues . . . . Numerous courts have held that
lost tax revenues can affect governmental entities’ proprietary interests.”49
She also notes the second general class of harms that courts have
acknowledged as constituting a cognizable injury for standing purposes—
increased expenditures on public services necessitated by the urban blight
that follows a sudden wave of foreclosures.
Whether by engaging in fraud, discrimination, or other forms of illegal
activity, predatory lenders cause borrowers to become financially
vulnerable. Victims of predatory lending can lose their homes to
foreclosure or forego necessities like food and heat in order to keep their
homes. They then turn to public agencies for assistance. Cities must meet
an increased demand for homeless shelters, heat subsidies, food stamps and
other relief programs. In addition, when families are dislocated, children’s
educations are interrupted, which can impose added costs on cities.
Neighborhoods become vulnerable, too. Abandoned homes become targets
for drug dealing and arson. As neighborhoods lose their cohesion, crime
increases. The need for police and fire services rises in relation to
neighborhood decline, further burdening city resources. It is a short
distance from acknowledgment of this immediate economic reality to the
judicial conclusion that “[t]he increased costs for city services directly
affects the proprietary interests of cities.”50
However, Engel subordinates the “fairly traceable” element of the
standing analysis to the “injury-in-fact” component, concluding that:
Where a city can demonstrate that lenders have deceived
borrowers into accepting loans on terms that they could not
afford and, as a result, the borrowers lost or could not maintain
their homes, resulting in reduced tax revenues and increased
demand for city services, a court could find that the city’s injuries
were ‘ fairly traceable’ to the predatory lending.51
Similarly, Raymond Brescia’s 2009 article goes directly to the merits
of Baltimore’s case against Wells Fargo. Brescia restricts his inquiry to
determining the proper test to apply in a disparate impact claim under the
FHA, measuring the degree of reverse redlining in urban communities,
applying the appropriate statistical tests to establish a prima facie case of
reverse redlining, and devising the correct judicial response to lenders’

49. Id. at 374-75.
50. Id. at 375-76 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 376.
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affirmative defenses for subprime lending.52 He acknowledges the
importance of establishing cities’ standing to sue in a proprietary capacity,
but directs his attention elsewhere, beyond the threshold jurisdictional
issue.53
In a separate article published that same year, Brescia devotes some
space to the argument that cities possess Article III standing. He asserts
“there is no doubt that governments have standing to bring suits alleging
harms to their interests, either as property owners or in their
representational capacity for their constituents.”54 Brescia compares the
municipalities’ situation to that faced by states suing in their quasisovereign capacities, and he relies on Massachusetts v. EPA to conclude
that the recent Supreme Court case bolstered government claims of
standing.55 In particular, he argues that alleging reduced property values
arising from predatory lending is “sufficient enough to confer standing,
especially where the municipality itself owns property impacted by
foreclosures of subprime loans.”56
Brescia expands on his assertions in an article from 2010. Relying on
the majority opinion from Massachusetts v. EPA, he argues that “[w]hile
the Massachusetts decision is nominally about the rights of states, . . . there
are also aspects of the decision that have implications for standing doctrine
generally.”57 Brescia asserts that the relaxed standing requirements that
attach to the states should be extended to municipalities as well.58 Based on
this diluted test for Article III standing, he posits that “[a]ctions that
contribute to harm, even when other forces may also be responsible for that
harm, even overwhelmingly, are actionable.”59 This would include third
parties whose actions resulted in a spike of foreclosures on private
homeowners, thereby depressing local property tax receipts.60 Where the
city can allege that a third party contributed to an actionable harm, that is
enough to have caused that harm for standing purposes.61 Any parsing of
52. Brescia, supra note 19, at 195-96.
53. Id. at 195.
54. Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in
Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 65 (2009).
55. Id. at 64.
56. Id. at 65.
57. Raymond H. Brescia, On Public Plaintiffs and Private Harms: The Standing of
Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, and Financial Crisis Litigation, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 7, 11 (2010).
58. Id.; see also id. at 48-49 (concluding that “courts need to take a fresh look at
causation in municipal lawsuits”).
59. Id. at 48-49.
60. Id. at 49.
61. Id. at 49 (concluding that where “illegal loan terms contribute to the reasons that
individual borrowers end up defaulting on their mortgages, the causation prong is met”).
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separate causal factors must wait until the damages stage of the judicial
process.62
Delving into a historical analysis of standing doctrine as it relates to
public nuisance actions, he cites Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast v. Cohen
for the proposition that suits brought by private parties standing as
“representatives of the public interest” should not automatically be
excluded by Article III’s case or controversy clause.63 From there, Brescia
discusses the historical tradition by which governmental bodies held the
power to enjoin public nuisances, even without “proof of special injury.”64
He is careful to qualify that this power has traditionally rested in the states,
and a scrutiny of history does not provide an answer to whether any other
public bodies have wielded this authority.65 Regardless, states may
maintain a public nuisance action with a showing of harm to the
community, and nothing more.66 The particularized injury requirements
articulated in Lujan are not necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction.67
Like Engel, Brescia aptly observes that as landowners, “municipalities
can allege damage to . . . property due to actions that diminish the value of
that property.”68 Brescia perceives that a showing of economic harms due
to fair housing violations, by itself, is sufficient to grant constitutional
standing, based on the analysis of Gladstone, Realtors. He correctly states
that the “questions of causation and redressability are nowhere to be found
in the court’s Gladstone, Realtors decision . . . .”69 From this, he concludes
that for the purposes of gauging a municipal entity’s standing to sue under
the FHA, factual pleadings that establish a cognizable injury-in-fact, in the
form of an economic loss to the city, are enough to survive a 12(b)(1)
motion.
Upon review of the literature, there appears to be no article or
comment devoted exclusively to whether municipalities have Article III
standing to pursue FHA claims against lenders for reverse redlining
violations. Rather, many authors proceed straight to the merits, choosing to
focus their attention on the cities’ ability to establish disparate impact
claims under the FHA. Such an analysis puts the cart before the horse.
This Comment addresses how and whether cities can get their foot in the

62. Id.
63. Id. at 40-41 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119-20 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
64. Id. at 41-42.
65. Id. at 42.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 44-45.
68. Id. at 45.
69. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
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courthouse door at all.
II. Why Can’t Cities Simply Sue on Behalf of Their Residents?
“It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted . . . that the forests on its
mountains . . . should not be further destroyed or threatened . . . that the
crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered . . . .”70
Before I move to the Article III question, the reader likely asks why
cities are barred from bringing suits on behalf of the public, much like an
administrative agency or state. However, derivative standing on behalf of
the taxpayer is not a viable option for municipalities injured by lenders’
reverse redlining. Bringing suit in this auxiliary capacity, otherwise known
as parens patriae, is a common law concept with historical antecedents in
English tradition. The sovereign is vested “with powers and duties—the
‘royal prerogative’—to protect certain interests of his subjects.”71 Rather
than suing in a private capacity to remedy wrongs sustained to one’s own
interests, the sovereign sues on behalf of the body politic. In the United
States, “the federal government and the states, as the twin sovereigns in our
constitutional scheme, may in appropriate circumstances sue as parens
patriae to vindicate interests of their citizens.”72 Over time, this concept
morphed from an idea that the state has the power to intervene and
“represent the interests of citizens who cannot represent themselves
because they are under a disability,” into the notion that the state may
“seek[] to protect a set of interests that it has in the well-being of its
populace.”73
One would intuit from a superficial reading of this doctrine that cities
possess the power to sue lenders on behalf of their residents to abate the
social ills that have befallen taxpayers as a result of the lenders’ alleged
FHA violations—even if municipalities as governmental units have
sustained none of these harms. Indeed, Brescia relied on Massachusetts v.
EPA’s relaxation of standing requirements for states to advance the

70. Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
71. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 131.
73. People ex rel. Hartigan v. Cheney, 726 F. Supp. 219, 222 (C.D. Ill. 1989). See
Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237 (“[T]he State has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.”); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (“[I]t must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the
inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend
them.”).
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proposition that cities can also sue on behalf of taxpayers to protect the
public interest without specifying any cognizable harm sustained by the
municipality proper.74
While states retain the ability to sue in this manner on behalf of the
citizenry, that power typically stems from “the unique quasi-sovereign
rights of a state to sue to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.” 75
In contrast, the longstanding Dillon’s Rule for municipal corporations
states that cities are largely creatures of the state’s making.76 From this
perspective on state and local relations, any power wielded by local
governments is limited to what legislatures have delegated for the
management of the local government’s day-to-day affairs. Thus, any
comparison of municipalities to state governments in the arena of abating
threats to the public welfare through affirmative litigation is inapposite.
Concededly, the Supreme Court has never specifically held that cities
may not pursue parens patriae actions.77 Nonetheless, its unsympathetic
treatment of these units “implies that they may not do so.”78 Yazback and
Entin conclude as much based on “a more general view that cities and other

74. See Brescia, supra note 54 (arguing that because Massachusetts v. EPA reduced the
standing burden for government plaintiffs, municipalities “should have a far easier time
overcoming the standing hurdle”); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007)
(stressing “the special position and interest of Massachusetts” as a sovereign state). Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, relied on cases from the early twentieth century for the
assertion that “States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal
jurisdiction.” Id. In a footnote, he referenced “the long development of cases permitting
States ‘to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests—i.e., public or
governmental interests that concern the state as a whole.’” Id. at 520 n.17 (quoting
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 289-90 (5th ed. 2003)).
75. Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229,
243-44 (2d. Cir. 1999); see also Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp.
2d 610 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (holding that state governments can sue tobacco companies without
regard to proximate cause, because of their inherent “political power,” “threat of legislative
action” and the parens patriae right to protect the public health) (quoting Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 912, 934 n.18 (3d Cir. 1999)), aff’d,
228 F.3d 429, 436 (3d Cir. 2000).
76. See Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 218 n.10 (6th
Cir. 2011) (describing Dillon’s Rule as limiting a municipality’s powers to those expressly
granted through the city’s charter, authorities implicit from those explicit delegations and
powers essential to accomplishing the municipal corporation’s purposes); Terrence P. Haas,
Note, Constitutional Home Rule in Rhode Island, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 677, 67980 (2006) (noting that Dillon’s Rule states that municipal corporations possess the powers
explicitly delegated to them, the powers that are necessarily or fairly implied to those
expressed powers and the powers that are essential to the declared purposes of the
corporation).
77. Entin & Yazback, supra note 18, at 763.
78. Id.
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political subdivisions do not enjoy the protections of the Eleventh
Amendment because they are not sovereign.”79 This view of cities as the
low men on the totem pole in the federalist system was affirmed in the
1890 case of Lincoln County v. Luning and again in the 2001 case of Board
of Trustees v. Garrett.80 Thus, it should come as no surprise that lower
federal courts have consistently held that political subdivisions at the local
level cannot sue as parens patriae.81 Hence, the parens patriae avenue to
litigation is likely closed to cities, and perhaps rightfully so.82 Even if this
mode of litigation were available to municipalities, this form of standing
comes with its own burdensome requirements that must be satisfied to
successfully invoke federal jurisdiction.83
79. Id.
80. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001); Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S.
529, 530 (1890) (holding that political subdivisions do not get Eleventh Amendment
protection).
81. E.g., Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir.
1985) (“[P]olitical subdivisions . . . cannot sue as parens patriae because their power is
derivative and not sovereign.”); City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1048 (9th
Cir. 1979) (rejecting the city’s assertion of parens patriae standing because cities and
counties cannot sue in a derivative capacity); City of Hartford v. Towns of Glastonbury, 561
F.2d 1032, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (noting that the “power of a political
subdivision of a state is even more rigidly circumscribed” because “a city cannot sue as
parens patriae, but is limited to the vindication of such of its own proprietary rights”), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978); United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 185 F.R.D. 184, 189 n.3
(D.N.J. 1999) (recognizing courts’ refusal to let municipalities invoke parens patriae to
obtain federal jurisdiction); City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 1109, 1123
(E.D.N.Y.) (stating that a city “generally does not have parens patriae standing”), aff’d, 742
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’d, 476 U.S. 467 (1986); Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 544
F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that a municipal plaintiff “cannot maintain this
action as parens patriae”).
82. See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the
Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2545-46 (2006)
(“American political decentralization is regional rather than municipal—states, not cities,
are the salient sites for constitutionally protected ‘local’ governance. As a result, cities and
their leaders are three levels down the political food chain and must normally ask the states
for whatever powers they have or wish to exercise.”). In the context of his exposition on the
role of the city mayor as executive officer, Schragger observes that “the city operates within
a larger political and constitutional framework that significantly shapes the powers of the
city and its officials.” Id. at 2556. Even those cities that enjoy substantial home rule power
do so “contingent on grants of authority from the state or subject to revision by the state.”
Id. at 2558.
83. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“In
order to maintain such a[] [parens patriae] action, the State must articulate an interest apart
from the interests of particular private parties . . . . The State must express a quasi-sovereign
interest . . . . First, a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both
physical and economic—of its residents in general. Second, a State has a quasi-sovereign
interest in not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.” );
see also New York v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 675, 678 (W.D.N.Y. 1984)
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However, the capacity to sue in a proprietary interest remains
available to cities.84 In this sense, a municipality acts as a private litigant
and seeks redress for some harm it suffered, rather than suing on behalf of
individual taxpayers. This way, cities can sue on their own behalf to
vindicate those interests that are consistent with the taxpayer’s interests.
Given that the lower federal courts have closed off the parens patriae
avenue for cities, if municipalities are going to get their day in court on a
reverse redlining theory of liability, the prospective FHA action must be
proprietary in nature.
Suing in a proprietary interest entails the
conventional three-pronged standing inquiry fashioned by the courts over
the last several decades.
III.

The Three-Part Standing Inquiry: Why Cities Cannot Sue in a
Proprietary Capacity under the FHA to Recover on Reverse
Redlining Violations

“The City seeks to expand the law of standing to give every neighbor
with a pest infestation and every crime victim within a few blocks of a
house in foreclosure access to financial institutions in federal court.”85
In this section, I discuss why cities lack Article III standing to sue
mortgage lenders under the FHA. I conclude that cities can allege
significant economic losses as cognizable injuries-in-fact (specifically,
reduced property tax values and increased public maintenance expenditures
to remedy urban blight). I also do not dispute the contention that a sizable
damages award would work to remedy the harm inflicted on municipalities
as they attempt to stem the rising tide of urban degradation, thereby
satisfying the third “judicially redressable” element. However, I break
from existing literature with my contention that damages alleged by the
cities cannot be said to be fairly traceable to the defendant-lenders’
conduct, given the array of independent causal factors working to create the
harms suffered by the cities. But first, I include a brief explanation of
(conditioning a finding of parens patriae standing on a determination that “individuals
involved could not obtain complete relief through a private suit”) (citing New York v. 11
Cornwell Co., 695 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1982)). The upshot of the conditions necessary to
support a finding of parens patriae standing is that “the required showing here [is] harder,
not easier.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
84. Harris, 601 F.2d at 1044; In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122,
131 (9th Cir. 1973).
85. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint at 11, City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, No. 1:08-CV00062-JFM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2010).
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Article III standing.
A. What Is Article III Standing?
In this section, I provide a short overview of the constitutional
doctrine known as Article III standing. Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine
that has evolved out of Article III’s cases and controversies requirement.86
The court must ask “whether the constitutional or statutory provision on
which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the
plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”87 Put another way, “[s]tanding
concerns ‘whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring th[e] suit.’”88
Over time, the Supreme Court has specified the necessary elements to
demonstrate the standing standing required for subject-matter jurisdiction.
The three elements of Article III standing that a plaintiff must allege
include: (1) some cognizable injury-in-fact inflicted on the plaintiff (2)
fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct which (3) can be redressed
through a favorable court decision.89 The plaintiff bears the burden to
allege facts that show that these three elements exist.90 Would-be plaintiffs
ignore this component of subject-matter jurisdiction at their peril. The
court reporters are replete with cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due
to plaintiffs’ failures to properly allege standing.91
Its original justification was rooted in the constitutional separation of
powers.92 Designed to prevent courts from issuing advisory opinions and
86. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . [and]
controversies.”)
87. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
88. ProEnglish v. Bush, 70 F. App’x 84, 87 (4th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)).
89. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). The injury-infact can exist “solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which
creates standing . . . .’” Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S.
614, 617 n.3 (1973)). Even where the plaintiff is pursuing state law claims in a diversity
action, the plaintiff must still satisfy the federal standards for standing, not the
corresponding state court standard. White v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 913 F.2d 165, 167
(4th Cir. 1990).
90. Warth, 422 U.S. at 518; W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 627 (9th Cir.
1981).
91. E.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., 785 F. Supp. 2d 883, 901 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(dismissing complaint in its entirety because plaintiffs “failed to set forth factual allegations
establishing Article III standing”); Dash v. FirstPlus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 248 F. Supp.
2d 489, 500 n.12 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (refusing to address the merits of plaintiff’s contentions
because “the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter” for lack
of standing).
92. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (noting that standing is “founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society”); Vander Jagt v.
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value judgments, standing ensures that abstract concerns for some subject
do not imbue a plaintiff with the ability to have a court decide the merits of
a dispute or a particular issue.93 The practical result is that the standing
inquiry “focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.”94 This
requirement ensures that all parties to the litigation have personal and
diametrically opposed interests in the outcome.95 In the vast majority of
cases litigated in the federal courts, “there is scant need for courts to pause
over the standing inquiry . . . . In other sorts of cases, however, the nexus
between the legal claim and the individual asserting the claim may not be
so self-evident.”96
In this Comment, I focus specifically on Article III standing and not
on prudential standing, which is a closely related but still separate
doctrine.97 Given that the Supreme Court “has held that standing to bring a
FHA claim is coextensive with constitutional standing,” the question of
whether a city can bring a claim under the FHA in a proprietary capacity
collapses into the broader constitutional question.98 Thus, for the purposes
of this analysis, one “need only assess the three requirements of

O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring) (explaining that
standing concerns “the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected,
unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.” ).
93. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 40 (1976) (“[A]n organization’s abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by
an adjudication does not substitute for the concrete injury required by Art. III.”); Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (noting that the burden of producing some actionable injury
is not reduced by virtue of suing in an organizational capacity); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 156 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Without this
[standing] requirement, the federal judicial process would be transformed into ‘no more than
a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.’”) (quoting
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S.
464, 473 (1982)).
94. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
95. Id. at 101.
96. Friends of the Earth, 204 F.3d at 154.
97. Prudential standing requires that the plaintiff assert its own interests (and not those
of third parties). Furthermore, those interests cannot amount to generalized grievances and
must reside within the zone of interests protected by the statute granting the plaintiff his
cause of action. See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A
plaintiff must also satisfy the non-constitutional standing requirements of the statute under
which he or she seeks to bring suit . . . . Once the Article III standing requirement is
satisfied, this is a purely statutory inquiry.”); Friends of the Earth, 204 F.3d at 155 (“[A]n
individual must also satisfy any statutory requirements for standing before bringing suit.”).
98. Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coalition v. Accredited Home Lenders Holding Co., 573
F. Supp. 2d 70, 74 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
372 (1982).
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constitutional standing . . . .”99 But before I do so, I discuss the appropriate
standard of review for 12(b)(1) motions.
B. The District Courts Apply the Twombly/Iqbal Standard of Review
for a 12(b)(6) Motion to a 12(b)(1) Motion
“The district court erroneously concluded that lack of Article III
standing was grounds for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Though lack of statutory standing
requires dismissal for failure to state a claim, lack of Article III standing
requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”100
As FHA litigation continues to bubble out of the cauldron of the
foreclosure crisis, a curious schism has arisen in the district courts over the
proper standard of review governing a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing. In reviewing lenders’ motions to dismiss, several district courts
have elected to apply the heightened “plausibility” standard formulated for
a 12(b)(6) motion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, and later extended in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.101 The courts’ use of Twombly and Iqbal to scrutinize
whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring suit is wrong. The Article
III standing requirement did not evolve out of a need for plaintiffs to set
forth “plausible” (as defined by Twombly and Iqbal) factual allegations
that, taken as true, would entitle that party to relief. Rather, standing
formed as a response to the necessities of compliance with Article III’s
“cases and controversies” requirement.
At least one court of appeals has noted the problem with applying
heightened scrutiny to the pleadings when reviewing a motion alleging lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. In Maya v. Centex Corp., the Ninth Circuit
noted the difference between a complaint’s failure to allege statutory
standing, which is properly subject to a 12(b)(6) motion, and its failure to
allege Article III standing, which is to be reviewed under 12(b)(1).
99. Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. JFM-08-62, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44013, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2011).
100. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011).
101. See Mayor of Baltimore, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *5 (assuming that “the
plausibility standard applies equally to allegations concerning standing”); see also, Dodaro
v. Std. Pac. Corp., No. EDCV 09-01666-VAP (OPx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32136, at *1112. (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010), rev’d and remanded, Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 2011); Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
34303 at *6 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008) (concluding that when reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss, “the Court must apply a standard similar to that applied in reviewing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion”).
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Carefully separating the merits of the case from threshold jurisdictional
issues, Judge Fletcher observed that:
Twombly and Iqbal are ill-suited to application in the
constitutional standing context because in determining whether
plaintiff states a claim under 12(b)(6), the court necessarily
assesses the merits of the plaintiff’s case. But the threshold
question of whether plaintiff has standing (and the court has
jurisdiction) is distinct from the merits of his claim. Rather,
“[t]he jurisdictional question of standing precedes, and does not
require, analysis of the merits.” . . . This is not to say that
plaintiff may rely on a bare legal conclusion to assert injury-infact, or engage in an “ingenious academic exercise in the
inconceivable” to explain how defendants’ actions caused his
injury. We simply note that Twombly and Iqbal deal with a
fundamentally different issue, and that the court’s focus should
be on the jurisprudence that deals with constitutional standing.102
However, this doctrinal error has pervaded many of the district courts
reviewing actions instituted by private homeowners for FHA violations, as
well as those lawsuits involving municipalities suing to remedy urban
blight generated by alleged reverse redlining. Until more appeals from
dismissals of FHA complaints for lack of standing reach the appellate
courts, prospective municipal plaintiffs will likely have to formulate their
pleadings in such a way that complies with Twombly and Iqbal’s
particularity requirements, in order to overcome the Article III standing
requirement.
Before I move onto the FHA litigation, I emphasize that courts should
not demand scientific precision in complaints by cities alleging the
standing to sue.103 As a jurisdictional doctrine that does not go to the merits
of the complaint, the inquiry should be tantamount to a highly-reduced
form of review for proximate causation, like that found in tort law.
However, under this simplified standard, cities must still allege something,
and even under this quasi-proximate causation review, I assert that cities
cannot satisfy even this reduced burden.
C. Injury-in-Fact
“Sausalito and its citizens and employees would be harmed by
implementation of the Fort Baker Plan and the 2,700 daily visitors it would
102. Maya, 658 F.3d at 1068 (citation omitted).
103. See Friends of the Earth, 204 F.3d at 162 (declining to “transform the ‘fairly
traceable’ requirement into the kind of scientific inquiry that neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress intended”); Mayor of Baltimore, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44013, at *7.
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unleash in numerous significant respects including . . . lost property and
sales tax revenue due to impaired vehicular movement and commerce
rendering Sausalito less attractive to business.”104
Thus far, all of the complaints filed by municipalities have alleged two
different categories of harm. The first is reduction in property tax receipts.
The cities typically allege that “[w]hen homes became vacant, local
government incurred a series of expenses for police calls, fire calls,
boarding-up and cleaning properties.”105 As a result, not only are precious
municipal funds expended to prevent further deterioration of residential
neighborhoods, but they must be diverted from cash-strapped city agencies,
social insurance programs, and other important government projects. The
second category of harms generally alleged by the municipalities in their
pleadings includes depressed property tax receipts arising out of the
reduced home values that tend to accompany abandoned and vacant homes
due to mass foreclosures.
Over recent decades, the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that
erosion of the municipal tax base constitutes a cognizable injury-in-fact for
standing purposes. One of the earliest instances of a city suing on this basis
occurred in Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood.106 In this case, the
Village commenced an action against local realtors under Title VIII of the
FHA, alleging that the town suffered economic harm by “having [its]
housing market . . . wrongfully and illegally manipulated to the economic
and social detriment of the citizens of [the] village . . . .”107 The defendantrealtors moved to dismiss, arguing “that respondents had ‘no actionable
claim or standing to sue’ under the statutes relied upon in the
complaint . . . .”108 Justice Powell reasoned that a “significant reduction in
property values directly injures a municipality by diminishing its tax base,
thus threatening its ability to bear the costs of local government and to
provide services.”109 The Gladstone majority concluded that the village
had alleged facts sufficient to provide Article III standing. 110 The Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts have repeatedly reinforced the intuition

104. City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004).
105. City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48522, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. May 4, 2011).
106. 444 U.S. 91 (1979).
107. Id. at 95.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 110-11; see also id. at 115 (“[C]onvincing evidence that the economic value
of one’s own home has declined as a result of the conduct of another certainly is sufficient
under Art. III to allow standing to contest the legality of that conduct.”).
110. Id. at 115.
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that economic harm is a cognizable injury-in-fact in a number of cases.111
More specifically, conduct producing a drain on the plaintiff-organization’s
finite financial resources can imbue standing to sue in federal court.112 At
least one court of appeals has elected to extend this principle to actions
under the FHA.113
Given the abundant case law on the subject, it is uncontroversial to
posit that cities can successfully and easily allege cognizable injuries-infact in the form of diminished property tax bases, along with increased
expenditures on public welfare programs as a result of mass displacement
of minority communities in urban areas. The “fairly traceable” element is
where the fundamental and incurable defect in the cities’ FHA complaints
arises.
D. Injury “Fairly Traceable” to the Defendant’s Conduct

111. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972) (clarifying that “the
interest alleged to have been injured ‘may reflect aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
as well as economic values’”) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970)), superseded by statute, Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, as recognized in Fairview Twp. v.
EPA, 773 F.3d 517 (3d Cir. 1985); Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir.
2011) (agreeing with plaintiffs that purchases of homes at inflated prices were “actual and
concrete economic injuries”); Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 548
F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing previous statements that pecuniary injury
creates sufficient basis for standing); City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1199 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“[E]conomic . . . harms constitute injury to Sausalito’s ‘proprietary’ interests as
a municipal entity.”); San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1130 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“Economic injury is clearly a sufficient basis for standing.”).
112. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) (holding that racial
steering practices which impaired an organization’s ability to assist low-income homeseekers drained the organization’s financial resources, producing cognizable injury-in-fact
and giving the organization standing in its own right); Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., 573
F. Supp. 2d 70, 75 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing because
“plaintiff’s statement [that] they have expended resources on counteracting defendants’
policies are sufficient to state an injury in fact caused by defendant’s conduct”). In the tort
law context, then-Judge Kennedy adopted the position that expenses associated with the
provision of police and fire services are “to be borne by the public as a whole, not assessed
against the tortfeasor whose negligence creates the need for the service.” City of Flagstaff
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983). However, no other
federal court seems to have assumed this posture toward municipal expenditures since.
113. Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Expenditures to
reach out to potential home buyers or renters [injured by discriminatory advertising] . . . are
sufficiently tangible to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement.”); Nat’l Fair Hous.
Alliance, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 208 F. Supp. 2d 46, 54 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he Fair
Housing Group plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury in fact caused by defendant’s
conduct, [because the] . . . injury lies in their expenditure of scarce resources on identifying
and counteracting discrimination.”).
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However, alleging the infliction of some tangible injury-in-fact is
insufficient to successfully allege Article III standing. Plaintiffs must also
allege facts that show “a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘ fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court.”114 It is the
second element of the constitutional standing analysis that comprises the
crux of my analysis. Here, I argue that the district courts which have
concluded that Baltimore’s and Memphis’ complaints alleged conduct
fairly traceable to the lenders’ conduct fail to apply decades of Supreme
Court precedent on this issue. I start with a brief discussion of what the
standing inquiry demands from those plaintiffs who were not the direct
victims of the defendants’ conduct. Next, I illustrate the structural
infirmities in the cities’ complaints by drawing comparisons to the illegal
handgun and tobacco litigation of the late twentieth century, along with
more recent private actions instituted by borrowers purportedly duped into
purchasing residential properties at inflated prices by homebuilders.
E. Harm As an Indirect Result of Defendant’s Conduct
Where the harm to plaintiff resulted as an indirect consequence of the
defendant’s conduct, which “does not in itself preclude standing.”115
However, satisfying the “fairly traceable” element of standing may become
much more difficult when “the plaintiff is not himself the object of the
[defendant’s] action or inaction he challenges.”116 The indirectness of the

114. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky.
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
115. Hope, Inc. v. Cnty. of DuPage, 738 F.2d 797, 807 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975)). It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to maintain actions
in federal court despite suffering harms entirely collateral to a more direct victim of the
defendant’s actions. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472-77 (1987) (holding that
plaintiff has standing to challenge Justice Department’s designation of films as propaganda,
given that it would damage his public reputation and make it more difficult to run for
office); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973) (finding that environmental group had standing to challenge
Interstate Commerce Commission over rate increase expected to decrease recycling, which
in turn would impact forests and streams enjoyed by plaintiffs).
116. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562; see also Simon, 426 U.S. at 45 (recognizing that
indirectness of injury makes it more difficult to show that “the asserted injury was the
consequence of the defendants’ actions, or that prospective relief will remove the harm”);
Warth, 422 U.S. at 505 (“[I]ndirectness of the injury does not necessarily deprive the person
harmed of standing to vindicate his rights . . . . But it may make it substantially more
difficult . . . to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury was the consequence of the
defendants’ actions . . . .”).
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harm does not absolve the plaintiff from alleging “facts establishing that all
links in the causal chain are satisfied.”117 Any missing link in the causal
chain, or severing of that connection due to some third party’s intervention,
will likely result in a finding by the court that the plaintiff is not the proper
party to bring suit against the defendant.118
While the “fairly traceable” requirement demands some connection
between the plaintiff’s harm and defendant’s conduct, the causal link does
not need to be articulated with such scientific precision that the complaint
is Twombly-Iqbal proof.119 However, to avoid the evisceration of that
element and to avert dilution of the standing doctrine that prevents courts
from being transformed into vehicles for the promotion of litigants’ value
judgments, overly attenuated theories of liability will not survive motions
to dismiss for lack of standing. Before I turn to the immediate FHA
litigation, I describe in some detail the handgun and tobacco litigation of
the late 1990s and early 2000s, to provide context for my argument that
cities lack constitutional standing to sue under the FHA.
F. Past Is Prologue: Other State- and City-Sponsored Attempts at
Seeking Judicial Remedies to Combat Mass Social Ills
The ongoing foreclosure crisis is not the first urban epidemic that has
triggered a flight to the courts. In the late twentieth century, cities were
overwhelmed by a deluge of illegal firearms and the inevitable gun
violence accompanying it. In response, they sued several prominent gun
makers in an attempt to find monetary compensation for the bloodshed
enabled by Beretta, Smith & Wesson and others. Similarly, state and local
pension funds, staring down the prospect of insolvency as their
beneficiaries developed a laundry list of costly-to-treat smoking-related
diseases, instituted litigation against Phillip Morris and other purveyors of
nicotine products to seek damages for higher medical costs. In both
episodes, the federal courts generally dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for lack

117. Garelick v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1993).
118. See id. (finding a “missing link” in the chain of events causing plaintiffs’ injuries
when affirming district court’s dismissal for lack of standing).
119. Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals Inc., 913 F.2d 64,
72 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that the “fairly traceable” requirement “does not mean that
plaintiffs must show to a scientific certainty” that defendant’s behavior “caused the precise
harm suffered by the plaintiffs . . . . The ‘fairly traceable’ requirement . . . is not equivalent
to a requirement of tort causation.”). Admittedly, the “fairly traceable” step of the standing
inquiry bears more than a passing resemblance to the concept of proximate causation in tort.
Both demand some showing of a substantial causal link between the defendant’s conduct
and plaintiff’s harm. But it is important to remain clear that standing is a jurisdictional
inquiry, where the issue of proximate causation addresses the merits of the tort claim.
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of standing, due to highly attenuated causal theories. The factual
resemblance between the handgun and tobacco litigation and the present
FHA actions is imperfect but substantial. Relying on the analytical
framework espoused by the courts in those cases, I extend it to the present
cases to argue that the cities lack Article III standing to sue under the FHA.
i.

Tobacco Litigation

“When smokers changed to Philip Morris, every case of irritation of
nose or throat—due to smoking—either cleared up completely or definitely
improved! That is from the findings of distinguished doctors in clinical
tests of actual smokers – reported in an authoritative medical journal.”120
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a cluster of civil RICO actions
arrived in the federal courts, targeting the major tobacco companies,
particularly Philip Morris.121 The primary agitators were pension funds and
medical providers faced with large and increasing medical outlays due to
beneficiaries’ smoking-related illnesses.
The theory of liability typically went as follows: In the 1950s,
scientific studies arose, which found an indisputable link between smoking
and various health risks.122 In response, the defendant tobacco companies
embarked on a public relations blitzkrieg to persuade a credulous public
that the tobacco industry would research the possible links between
smoking and poor health, and disclose the results.123 “Defendants,
however, entered into a conspiracy to do just the opposite.”124 The tobacco
companies purportedly went one step further, and agreed to also “forgo
development of safer tobacco products.”125 As a result of the tobacco
companies’ alleged suppression of the scientific studies, the pension funds
120. Johnny Calls for Philip Morris, STANFORD RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACT OF
TOBACCO ADVER., http://med.stanford.edu/ohns/tobacco_ads/images/for_your_throat/heres_
johnny/large/morris_01.jpg (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
121. See, e.g., SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068 (D.C.
Cir. 2001); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. Pa.
1999), aff’d, 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000); Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d; Or. LaborersEmp’rs Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999);
Conn. Pipe Trades Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 101 (D. Conn. 2001);
Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (W.D. Wash.
1999); Ark. Carpenters’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936
(E.D. Ark. 1999); Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2003); Coyne v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 1999).
122. Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 961.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
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were blocked from receiving accurate information about the true dangers of
smoking.126 Were the pension funds able to access the scientific studies, so
the theory goes, they would have taken action “to reduce smoking rates
among their participants. This reduction in smoking rates would have led
to a reduction in smoking-related disease among the funds’ participants
which would have in turn led to lowering plaintiffs’ expenditures.”127 As to
damages, the funds and providers alleged they were entitled to “monies
spent to reimburse [their] participants for their medical care due to smoking
related illnesses.”128
Like the mortgage lenders in the municipalities’ now-pending FHA
actions, the tobacco companies pounced on the providers’ and pension
funds’ derivative theory of liability, pointing to the attenuated causal links
between the beneficiaries’ smoking and subsequent uptick in plaintiffs’
medical expenses years later.129 And like the current FHA actions, the
federal courts were receptive to that argument. By and large, the funds’
and providers’ RICO complaints were dismissed due to proximate
causation and/or standing problems.130 The federal courts used a threefactor remoteness test for RICO actions from Holmes v. Security Investor
Protection Corp. to gauge the plaintiffs’ standing:
(1) [W]hether there are more direct victims of the alleged
wrongful conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law as
private attorneys general; (2) whether it will be difficult to
ascertain the amount of plaintiff’s damages attributable to
defendant’s wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will
have to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages to obviate
the risk of multiple recoveries.131

126. Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 962.
127. Id.
128. R.I. Laborers’, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
129. See Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229,
239 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing defendants’ argument that because “plaintiffs’ alleged
injuries . . . flow from the misfortunes visited upon third persons . . . plaintiffs therefore
stand at too remote a distance to recover”); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116
F. Supp. 2d 610,612 (W.D. Pa. 1999) (registering defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s
“injuries are too remote as a matter of law for them to have standing to sue the
Defendants”), aff’d, 228 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2000).
130. See Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 849 (6th Cir. 2003) (listing cases
from eight different circuits to show that “other federal circuit courts . . . uniformly have
concluded that such claims must fail because the alleged injuries are too remote”); R.I.
Laborers, 99 F. Supp. at 182-83 (referencing “at least eleven federal district courts and three
circuit courts . . . that concluded that those claims should be dismissed on grounds of
proximate cause and/or standing”).
131. Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 963. Other federal courts followed in the footsteps of
Or. Laborers, using the same test from Holmes. See SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Phillip

MARLL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/25/2012 4:25 PM

DO MUNICIPALITIES HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING?

281

Regarding the first “direct victim” element of the Holmes test, the
Ninth Circuit found that the smokers, as “more direct victims of the alleged
wrongful conduct and who can be counted on to vindicate the injury caused
by defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct, weighs heavily in favor of
barring plaintiffs’ actions.”132 By the plaintiffs’ own theories of liability,
the funds’ and hospitals’ claims were “derivative of the injuries suffered by
the smoker patients.”133 For the spike in tobacco-related medical costs to
impact the providers and pension funds, an injury to smokers must first
have occurred before the plaintiffs could incur increased expenses to pay
for those smokers’ medical costs.134 Even ignoring the secondhand nature
of the funds’ injuries and conceding the existence of a sinister tobacco
conspiracy, “the agency of the individual smokers in deciding whether, and
how frequently, to smoke” was the ultimate determinant of the funds’
ultimate medical expenditures.135 In contrast, “there are injured persons,
i.e., the smokers, capable and motivated to bring suit, thus ‘promot[ing] the
general interest in deterring injurious conduct.’”136 The circuit courts
seized on this lengthy causal chain to conclude that “[t]here is therefore no
direct link between the alleged misconduct of the tobacco companies and

Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that “harms alleged by the
funds and nations are too remote from the defendants’ alleged wrongdoing to provide
antitrust or RICO standing”); Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 236-37 (applying same test
drawn from Holmes for standing in RICO actions); R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 185-87
(using the Holmes factors to evaluate a motion to dismiss); see also Ark. Carpenters’ Health
& Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 936, 942 (E.D. Ark. 1999) (following
Or. Laborers in applying the three-pronged Holmes test for standing in tobacco RICO and
antitrust actions).
132. Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964. But see Ark. Carpenters, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 943
(reciting the Or. Laborers Court’s use of the Holmes test to decide “that the RICO and
antitrust claims in the case at bar should be dismissed as well”).
133. Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1223
(W.D. Wash. 1999); see Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 239 (explaining that damages “are
entirely derivative of the harm suffered by plan participants as a result of using tobacco
products,” deciding that the injuries were indirect and “purely contingent on harm to third
parties” and noting that the plaintiffs would have to prove “(1) the effect any smoking
cessation programs or incentives would have had on the number of smokers among the plan
beneficiaries; (2) the countereffect that the tobacco companies’ direct fraud would have had
on the smokers . . . and (3) other reasons why individual smokers would continue smoking”
); see also Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268-69 (1992) (stating that “a
plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a third
person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to
recover” ); Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 116 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (concluding that “to the extent that
the Plaintiffs’ claims are based simply on indirect cost increases from smoking-related
injuries, said injuries are not ‘direct’” ).
134. Ass’n of Wash., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
135. Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240.
136. R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. at 185.
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the claimed damage to plaintiffs.”137
The difficulty in estimating the damages caused by the tobacco
companies’ alleged conspiracy also proved fatal to the providers’ and
funds’ complaints, per the second Holmes element. “[C]onsiderable
speculation would be involved in identifying the costs that have caused the
alleged financial instability of the funds . . . .”138 As noted in SEIU, “it is
difficult to know how smokers might have behaved with more complete
information . . . .”139 Even when the plaintiffs offered statistical analysis to
quantify the precise harms resulting from the tobacco companies’ purported
campaign of deception, “the speculative nature of the claimed damages”
remained an obstacle to any finding of standing to maintain a RICO
action.140 The Laborers Local 17 Court pointedly observed that this species
of lawsuit “seems to present precisely the type of large, complicated
damage claims that Holmes . . . sought to avoid.”141 Judge Janet Arterton,
in the District of Connecticut, cited to Holmes for the proposition that “the
more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to determine the
amount of plaintiff’s damages attributable to the wrongdoing as opposed to
other, independent factors.”142 The high number of separate behavioral
decisions independently made by each smoker combined with the prospect
of endless counterfactuals about cancer-free union workers necessary to put
a dollar figure on the damages claims led most courts to throw up their
hands in exasperation, resolving the second Holmes element in favor of the
tobacco companies.143
The secondhand nature of the harms sustained by the pension funds
fed into the third element of the Holmes inquiry, which also militated
against a finding of standing for the funds and providers. The possibility
that the smokers themselves could sue the tobacco companies (though not

137. Ass’n of Wash., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (quoting Or. Laborers, 185 F.3d at 964).
138. SEIU Health & Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1074 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240.
142. Conn. Pipe Trades Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 101, 105 (D.
Conn. 2001) (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70).
143. See R.I. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d
174, 178 (D.R.I. 2000) (noting the difficulty of predicting damages with any specificity
because “ascertaining damages would require layers of hypothetical models speculating as
to the actions of the Fund, the smokers, and the interplay between the actions of both”);
Ass’n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1224 (W.D.
Wash. 1999) (considering “how many smokers would have stopped smoking with more
information, how many would have smoked less dangerous products, how much healthier
these hypothetical reformed smokers would have been, and how much less unreimbursed
care and services would have been incurred by the plaintiffs”).
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under state or federal RICO statutes) counseled against finding that the
pension funds had standing, because “the courts would be forced ‘to adopt
complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs at different levels
of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple
recoveries.’”144 Individual plaintiffs targeting the tobacco companies with
civil suits sought “the same recovery as the Fund[s], i.e., their medical
expenses, among their other claims for damages.”145 The Laborers Local
17 Court noted that under New York law, “the smokers are prohibited from
recovering medical costs paid to them by insurers.”146 Nonetheless, the
potential for litigious employers to also go after the tobacco companies,
combined with the headaches produced by federal ERISA law and the
single satisfaction rule, lead that court to find that Holmes’ third prong
pointed toward granting the companies’ motions to dismiss. Similarly, the
Rhode Island Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund Court perceived the risk of
double recoveries to be too great. Rhode Island’s collateral source rule
meant that a plaintiff’s damages could not be reduced to the extent
plaintiffs had received prior reimbursement for medical expenses.147
Combined with the risk of employer-instituted litigation to retrieve
increased health insurance contributions, that court also held that Holmes
commanded the dismissal of the suit.148
At least two circuit courts in the tobacco litigation also relied on a sixpart test articulated in Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State
Council of Carpenters, to assess the funds’ and providers’ antitrust
claims:149
(1) [T]he casual connection between defendant’s wrongdoing and
plaintiff’s harm; (2) the specific intent of defendant to harm
plaintiff; (3) the nature of plaintiff’s alleged injury (and whether
144. Or. Laborers-Employers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185
F.3d 957, 966 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269); see also SEIU, 249 F.3d at
1075 (determining that plaintiff failed the “risk of double recovery” element of the Holmes
test because “individual smokers may seek recoveries for the same alleged conduct under
state law theories and . . . other similar potential plaintiffs might also pursue similar antitrust
and RICO claims against the tobacco industry, double recovery could occur”).
145. R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
146. Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 240.
147. R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
148. Id. at 190.
149. Like many of the other cases referenced in this Comment, Associated General’s
test blurs the line between the tort element of proximate causation and constitutional
standing. See Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 438 (3d Cir. 2000)
(noting that Associated General “outlined six factors for determining proximate cause and
standing”); see also Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171
F.3d 912, 929 (3d Cir. 1999) (summarizing application of Associated General six-part test
to determine that funds lack standing to pursue antitrust claims against tobacco companies).
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it relates to the purposes of the antitrust laws, i.e., ensuring
competition within economic markets); (4) “the directness or
indirectness of the asserted injury”; (5) whether the “damages
claim is . . . highly speculative”; and (6) “keeping the scope of
complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits,” i.e.,
“avoiding either the risk of duplicate recoveries on the one hand,
or the danger of complex apportionment of damages on the
other.”150
Although this test has more parts than the one in Holmes, the inquiry
is essentially the same, albeit dealing with an antitrust action. Within the
context of the Associated General test, the Allegheny Court came out the
same way, despite resolving several of the elements of the antitrust test in
favor of plaintiff-hospitals. The Third Circuit conceded that the alleged
conspiracy to mask the health risks of smoking would form a but-for causal
connection between the tobacco companies and the medical providers’
injuries, that the tobacco companies’ conspiracy was borne out of a desire
to “shift the costs of the nonpaying patients’ tobacco-related illnesses to the
Hospitals,” and that the hospitals’ claims were of the general type intended
to be remedied by federal antitrust laws.151 Furthermore, the court, in
affirming the district court on its determination that “the Hospitals seem
like the appropriate party,” acknowledged that “nonpaying patients in the
present case, while more directly injured, may be unwilling to sue the
Tobacco Companies for antitrust violations.”152
Yet like those courts, which opted to apply the Holmes test, the
plaintiff-hospitals stumbled over the “directness of injury” hurdle. The
Third Circuit noted that the hospitals’ injuries were entirely derivative of
nonpaying patients’ injuries.153 As a result, those harms were “too remotely
connected in the causal chain from wrongdoing on the part of Tobacco
Companies; thus, the Hospitals’ injuries do not satisfy the directness of

150. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 438 (quoting Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 924).
151. Id. at 439; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 929-30 (noting a genuine causal
connection “between the conduct of the tobacco companies and the injury suffered by the
plaintiff Funds” and finding that plaintiffs successfully alleged that defendants’ conspiracy
specifically targeted them and admitting that plaintiffs’ “inability to obtain and use
information on the dangers of smoking or on smoking-cessation methods–may be of the
type that the antitrust laws are intended to prevent”).
152. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 440; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930 (recognizing
unlikelihood that smokers would bring their own antitrust claims).
153. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 440; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 930 (stating that the
“sheer number of links in the chain of causation that connect the defendants’ suppression of
information on the dangers of their products . . . to the Funds’ increased expenditures are
greater than in any case we can find in which this court or the Supreme Court has found
antitrust standing”).
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injury factor.”154 The court found that the high number of links in the
causal chain created “vast uncertainty about the Hospitals’ damages.”155
The Allegheny Court, skeptical of the ability of statistical modeling to
estimate damages, determined that any damages would be highly
speculative.156
Ultimately, the Associated General test incorporated a number of
factors that militated in favor of finding that the plaintiff-hospitals had
standing to sue under the antitrust laws. However, those factors were
“outweighed . . . by the sheer remoteness of the Hospitals’ injuries from the
alleged conspiracy,” which in turn manifested itself in “the highly
speculative nature of the Hospitals’ damages claims . . . [and] in the
directness of the Hospitals’ injuries.”157
ii.

Handgun Litigation

“Introducing the Beretta Model 86, the only .380 automatic pistol
with a tip-up barrel for easy and rapid loading . . . . If you’re considering a
handgun for personal protection, here’s one that offers it all.”158
Like the tobacco companies, handgun makers were also caught in the
torrential downpour of state and local government-sponsored litigation in
the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. From 2000 to 2003,
several municipalities filed civil complaints in state and federal court
against various gun makers, relying on state product liability statutes and
common law claims of public nuisance.159 Unlike the tobacco litigation,

154. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 441; see also Steamfitters 171 F.3d at 925 (doubting
“whether there exists a causal connection (proximate or otherwise) between any antitrust
wrongdoing on the part of the defendants and the Funds’ alleged injuries of increased health
care expenditures”).
155. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 441; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 929-30 (noting that
calculating damages through statistical models can be more difficult than proponents
suggest).
156. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 433; see also Steamfitters, 171 F.3d at 929 (“It is apparent
why the Funds argue they can demonstrate all of this through aggregation and statistical
modeling: it would be impossible for them to do so otherwise.”).
157. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 443.
158. Women and Guns, VIRGINIA COMMONWEALTH UNIVERSITY, http://www.womenand
guns.vcu.edu (last visited Dec. 6, 2012).
159. See, e.g., Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F.
Supp. 2d 245 (D.N.J. 2000); White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D.
Ohio 2000); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001); City of Boston v.
Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. Ct. LEXIS 352 (July 13,
2000); James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); City of
Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
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which culminated in an ugly wave of dismissals for lack of standing,
several of the cities’ lawsuits against the handgun manufacturers survived
the motion to dismiss stage.160
In this batch of cases, the cities typically alleged that the gun makers
“created a nuisance through their ongoing conduct of marketing,
distributing, and selling firearms in a manner that facilitated their flow into
the illegal market.”161 It was the gun makers’ alleged knowing support for
the illegal secondary firearms market that created the nuisance causing the
municipalities’ injuries, not the use of the guns themselves.162 On the
product liability side, the cities also alleged negligently defective design of
the handguns, failure to include adequate safety warnings or features that
would inhibit unlawful access or transfer by unauthorized handgun users.163
Like the tobacco companies, the gun makers focused on the cities’ highly
attenuated theory of liability to attack their standing to pursue these state
law claims.
Importantly for the purposes of this Comment, the municipalities filed
direct suits—not on behalf of resident taxpayers, but in their own capacities
as private litigants.164 The cities’ claims were “not based on the rights of
others, but rather the rights of the City to sue for the harm and economic
losses it ha[d] incurred, as well as their claims of unjust enrichment and

160. Compare Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. at 245 (granting 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for lack of standing), and District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 847 A.2d 1127
(D.C. 2004) (affirming trial court’s decision that plaintiff has not stated a public nuisance
claim), and In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 663 (Ct. App. 2005) (affirming grant
of summary judgment for defendant gunmakers due to plaintiffs’ failure to establish causal
connection between unfair practices and harm), and Ganim, 780 A.2d 98 (affirming
dismissal for lack of standing), and City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d
1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004) (reversing appellate court and dismissing city’s public nuisance
complaint), and New York v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192, 194-195 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (affirming motion court’s dismissal of state’s complaint due to proximate
causation issues), with White, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (denying gun makers’ 12(b)(1) motion to
dismiss), and City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1249 (Ind. 2004)
(holding that city may proceed with its public nuisance claim), and City of Boston, 2000
Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 (denying motion to dismiss for lack of standing), and James, 820
A.2d 27 (affirming denial of motion to dismiss); and City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d 1136
(reversing and finding that city had standing to pursue its product liability and nuisance
claims).
161. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1143; see also City of Boston, 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 352 at *7-8 (offering additional arguments in the handguns line of cases).
162. Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 250-52 (summarizing plaintiff’s claims that
“defendants allegedly produce, market and distribute substantially more handguns than they
reasonably expect to sell to law-abiding purchasers”).
163. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 108; City of Boston, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 at *9-10;
James, 820 A.2d at 34; City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1145.
164. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 117-18; James, 820 A.2d at 45; White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
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nuisance abatement.”165
Addressing the threshold jurisdictional issue of standing, the courts
generally concluded that the fiscal costs of weathering the violent crime
induced by an influx of illegal handguns constituted an injury-in-fact. The
Cincinnati court separated the economic losses sustained by the city into
two parts: the increased expenses of remedying violent crime and reduced
tax receipts arising from lowered property values.166 Both the Cincinnati
and Camden courts took care to note that the alleged injuries were distinct
from those of city taxpayers.167 In particular, “the County’s alleged injury
is distinguishable from that of its citizens,” because “[t]he alleged costs of
combating illegal gun possession do not flow solely from harm visited
upon a third party; they are alleged to exist as a result of separate and direct
harm defendants have visited upon the County itself.”168 Thus, Cincinnati
and Camden County successfully alleged a cognizable injury-in-fact,
surmounting the first hurdle in the standing inquiry.169
The Cincinnati Court applied the Holmes test to conclude that the City
itself had standing to pursue its claims against the gun makers. Ignoring
any analysis that actually focused on whether the City’s fiscal damages
were “fairly traceable” to the defendant-gun makers’ conduct, the Ohio
Supreme Court examined only the difficulty of proving damages, the
probability of double recovery by both the City and some other
hypothetical plaintiff and whether requiring more directly injured victims
to bring suit would better serve the interest of deterring gun makers’
harmful conduct. Notably, this logic is devoid of any scrutiny of
Cincinnati’s theory of liability. Nothing in the majority opinion speaks to
whether the gun makers’ conduct could fairly be seen to have resulted in
the City’s harms. Chief Justice Moyer in dissent did not overlook this
gaping hole in the majority’s analysis. Relying on Ganim, he recited the
numerous links in the causal chain required to connect the gun makers’
conduct and Cincinnati’s harms:
[M]anufacturers sell handguns to distributors or wholesalers . . . .
Next, retailers sell the guns legally either to authorized buyers,
i.e., legitimate consumers, or to unauthorized buyers . . . . Next,
the illegally acquired guns enter a black market, eventually
finding their way to unauthorized users. At this point, either
authorized buyers misuse the handguns by not taking proper

165. White, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 825. E.g., Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 256 (suing to
recover “the institutional costs of combating the flow of illegal handguns into the County”).
166. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1148.
167. Id.
168. Camden Cnty., 123 F. Supp. 2d at 256.
169. Id.
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storage or other unwarned or uninstructed precautions, or
unauthorized buyers misuse the guns to commit crimes or other
harmful acts. The city then incurs expenses for various
municipal necessities, including crime investigation, emergency
and other medical services for the injured, or similar expenses.
Finally, the city may suffer financial consequences, including
increased costs for municipal services . . . [and] reduced property
values . . . .170
Drawing on comparisons between the present appeal and Ganim,
along with the ill-fated tobacco litigation, the dissent found “the number of
links in this factual chain was in and of itself strongly suggestive of
remoteness.”171 Chief Justice Moyer was careful to separate the question of
whether the city could prove that it sustained some cognizable injury from
whether the city could show “that those damages are attributable to the
wrongdoing of the gun manufacturers as opposed to other, independent
factors.”172 Similarly, the White Court reduced the “fairly traceable”
component to a paragraph. While concluding that the City of Cleveland
alleged “a causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ injuries and the
conduct complained of,” it declined to clarify its ruling that the City had
pleaded sufficient facts to satisfy the second component of the standing
inquiry.173 Despite acknowledging that a finding of standing would be
weakened considerably, were the City’s injuries “the result of the
independent action of some third party,” the district court allowed the suit
to proceed as having successfully invoked federal jurisdiction.174 Likewise,
the Arms Technology Court reduced the standing test to a one-stage inquiry
into the nature of the injury suffered by the plaintiff.175 The bulk of the
analysis concentrated on the merits of the City of Newark’s tort action and
the issue of proximate causation. The New Jersey court extended the
application of Associated General Contractor’s remoteness analysis in the
antitrust context to the immediate case. It acknowledged “the fact that
there may be . . . multiple links between defendants’ conduct and the
ultimate harm suffered by the City . . . .”176 Nonetheless, the court opted to
“fold into a single link” the numerous steps in the City’s theory of

170. City of Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1152-53 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 98 (Conn. 2001)).
171. Id. at 1153 (quoting Ganim, 780 A.2d at 98).
172. Id. at 1154 (emphasis added) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S.
258, 269 (1992)).
173. White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
174. Id.
175. James v. Arms Tech. Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 44-46 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
176. Id. at 39.
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liability.177 Turning to Holmes, the court quickly determined that the harms
suffered by the City as a consequence of any alleged flooding of local
markets with cheap handguns were not too derivative of harms suffered by
victimized taxpayers.178 It concluded by distinguishing Holmes from the
case before it, stating that policy reasons justified allowing the City to
reach discovery in order to establish that its damages were attributable to
the defendants.179
For those cities whose complaints did not survive the gun makers’
motions to dismiss, the “fairly traceable” element of standing proved to be
the plaintiffs’ downfall. Drawing on the six-part test for proximate
causation in Associated General Contractors, the Camden County Court
determined that of the six Associated General factors for standing in an
antitrust suit, only the “causal connection” and “general aims advanced”
factors were satisfied.180 While allegations of an extremely attenuated
causal connection linked the gun companies’ conduct to the County’s
harms, and allowing the County to maintain its tort action would have
advanced “the general aims of New Jersey tort law,” the “sheer
remoteness” of the alleged injuries overcame all else.181 The highly
attenuated causal theory combined with the highly speculative nature of
damages to create a jurist’s nightmare in producing a dollar figure for a
damages award and apportioning it among multiple defendants.182
iii. Private Homeowners’ Actions Against Homebuilders
In 2008, seven separate class actions hit the Central District of
California, along with two class actions filed in the District of South
Carolina and Western District of North Carolina.183 Plaintiffs’ theories of

177. Id.
178. Id. at 53.
179. Id. at 42-43.
180. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d
245, 264 (D.N.J. 2000).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Dodaro v. Std. Pac. Corp., No. EDCV 09-01666-VAP (OPx), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th
Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., No. EDCV 09-01674 VAP(DTBx), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d
1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Lumalu v. M.D.C. Holdings, Inc., No. EDCV 09-01669 VAP(OPx),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44797 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex
Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Maya v. Centex Corp., No. EDCV 09-01671
VAP(OPx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v. Centex
Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Nielson v. Shea Homes, Inc., No. EDCV 09-01673
VAP(DTBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by Maya v.
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liability in each case were largely identical: Defendant homebuilders
duped them into buying residential properties in ostensibly stable and
family-oriented communities. The homebuilders represented to the
plaintiff-buyers that they were selling homes to buyers who had the
financial means to afford the houses and who would be good neighbors.184
Meanwhile, the defendants marketed unsold houses in the same
communities to unqualified and high-foreclosure-risk buyers and to those
who possessed no intent of occupying the properties to increase sales and
profits per housing unit sold.185 Defendants purportedly were aware that
this could have significant negative consequences on the overall
desirability of living and owning properties in these residential
neighborhoods.186 The harms alleged were twofold. First, plaintiffs
claimed that they bought into the housing market at an inflated price,
thanks to defendants’ machinations to artificially boost the local real estate
market and willful failure to disclose the true nature of the high-risk
buyers.187 Second, once the housing bubble deflated and unqualified
buyers in the neighborhood defaulted en masse, subsequent foreclosure
proceedings wiped out the accrued value in plaintiffs’ residences and
sparked development of suburban blight in plaintiffs’ neighborhoods.188
In granting the homebuilder’s 12(b)(1) motion, the Beazer Court
pointed to the innumerable intervening factors that could potentially have
driven the jump in foreclosures that reduced the fair market value of
plaintiffs’ real estate holdings:
[I]t does not necessarily follow from this allegation that these
third party home buyers subsequently defaulted on their
mortgages due to the Defendants’ conduct rather than those
buyers having failed to make their mortgage payments as a result
of other factors, such as unemployment, health problems, a
general weakening in the economy, or other financial conditions.
In addition to the failure of these mortgagors to make their
Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Oneto v. Ryland Grp., Inc. No. EDCV 0901670 VAP(DTBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44792 (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled by
Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011); Stephens v. Lennar Corp., No. EDCV
09-01668 VAP (DTBx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32111 (C.D. Ca. Mar. 31, 2010), overruled
by Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Tingley v. Beazer Homes
Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008) (dismissing
class action brought against homebuilders); Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-109CMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66887 (D.S.C., Sept. 10, 2007) (dismissing a class action
brought against homebuilders).
184. Dodaro, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32136 at *4.
185. Id. at *4-5.
186. Id. at *5.
187. Id. at *6.
188. Id.
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payments, there is the issue of the intervening decisions by the
mortgage assignees to foreclose the defaulted mortgages rather
than to restructure the loans, which may have been done for
reasons totally apart from the alleged fraud. Further, it is quite
speculative that the depreciation in value of the Plaintiffs’
property was caused by the foreclosures of these third party
properties rather than as a result of a myriad of other factors, such
as rising unemployment in the region, changes in the housing
market, or other economic conditions. It is just as plausible that
any of these other factors caused any reduction in the Plaintiffs’
property value.189
Judge Virginia Phillips, granting the homebuilders’ 12(b)(1) motions
with respect to all seven class actions in the Central District, drew on
Beazer’s rationale to determine that the beleaguered homeowners’
pleadings satisfied neither the injury-in-fact nor the fairly-traceable prongs
of the standing test. One of the incurable flaws in their complaints, she
reasoned, was that “[p]laintiff’s theory is premised upon a chain of
causation that is affected by general economic factors,” including “collapse
of financial institutions, changes in the credit market, and rising
unemployment, which by themselves or in combination affect the housing
market.”190 Each of these factors comprised “independent forces and
individual decisions of ‘some third part[ies] not before the court.’”191
Similarly, the Green Court dismissed plaintiff’s RICO claims on a 12(b)(1)
motion due to “difficulties as to the second (causation) and third
(redressability) prongs.”192 Noting that “the alleged wrongs relate to
actions directed toward other homeowners or their lenders,” the court found
that, the plaintiff, having “at most, suffered collateral injury as a result of a
generalized market impact of wrongs directed toward others” was
insufficient to confer Article III standing.193
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Central District of California
189. Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303, at
*11-12 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008).
190. Dodaro, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32136, at *27-28.
191. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560-61 (1992)).
192. Green v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07-1098-CMC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66887, at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2007).
193. Id. Concededly, Beazer’s analysis was performed in the context of Twombly/Iqbal
“plausibility” scrutiny for a 12(b)(6) motion, rather than a less-stringent mode of analysis.
As I argued earlier, demanding a certain level of plausibility or factual particularity from the
plaintiff to survive a 12(b)(1) motion gets the standard of review for Article III standing
wrong. However, there remains an important kernel of truth in the district court’s analysis:
Far too many external forces operate upon the housing market at the same time for a court to
competently parse the direction and magnitude of the impact on house prices.
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with respect to the grant of the 12(b)(1) motions for the seven class actions,
choosing to find that although “plaintiffs have not established how
defendants actions’ necessarily result in foreclosure, nor do plaintiffs’
complaints allege that the decreased value is caused by the risk posed by
their neighbors (even absent foreclosures),” they deserved permission to
amend their complaint to cure the causal defects blocking a proper finding
of Article III standing.194 The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court,
in order to allow the plaintiffs to include expert testimony that could
establish a sufficient link between the homebuilders’ actions and decreased
home value. This constituted an explicit recognition of the fundamental
defect in the private homeowners’ theory of liability.
IV.

WHY CITIES LACK ARTICLE III STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE
FHA

The municipality-sponsored FHA litigation that is the impetus for this
Comment should be uniformly dismissed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. First, the judicially formulated tests for statutory standing in
the antitrust and RICO contexts should be imported into the Article III
“fairly traceable” test when facing FHA actions alleging economic losses.
Those multipronged inquiries were formed to determine whether the
plaintiff, suffering pecuniary harms arising from a series of interconnected
events, is the proper party to commence litigation. Although this would
necessitate an insertion of common law from antitrust and RICO litigation
into the FHA context, it is appropriate here, given the daisy chain theory of
liability relied on by the cities in their claims arising from wholly pecuniary
harms inflicted by the defendant-lenders. The courts resolving the handgun
and tobacco litigation opted to apply the antitrust and RICO causation tests
in their own analyses for proximate causation and constitutional
standing.195 The application of those tests militates toward a finding that

194. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1072 (9th Cir. 2011).
195. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 121 (Conn. 2001)
(applying the standing analysis used by Second Circuit in Laborers Local 17 and Holmes);
City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 1999-02590, 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352,
at *17 (Mass. July 13, 2000) (explaining and applying the Holmes direct injury test);
Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245 n.8
(D.N.J. 2000) (describing the Associated General test as not appropriate in all causation
analyses but “useful in this particular case alleging economic harm due to the actions or
omissions of remote actors in the marketplace”); see also Laborers Local 17 Health &
Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying the Associated
General six-factor test to grant a motion to dismiss). The Ameriquest Court took note of the
City of Cincinnati Court’s use of Holmes in the firearms litigation context and extended it to
the proximate causation analysis at issue in Cleveland’s public nuisance claim against
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the cities have failed to allege injuries “fairly traceable” to the defendants’
conduct. Thus, Baltimore and Memphis should be found to have failed to
properly allege constitutional standing, by virtue of the dubious causal
theory intended to satisfy the second element of this test for subject-matter
jurisdiction.
I begin with the Holmes test, and a reemphasis of its three prongs: (1)
whether more direct victims of the defendant’s wrongful conduct can be
counted on to act as private attorneys general, (2) whether estimating
plaintiff’s damages will be a strenuous affair and (3) whether complicated
apportionment of damages will be in order to obviate the risk of multiple
recoveries.196
To start, there are thousands of more direct victims of the lenders’
reverse redlining—the foreclosed-upon homeowners themselves.197 A
private class action under the FHA would encompass a theory of liability
significantly less attenuated than the one currently advanced by Baltimore
and Memphis: By targeting urban minority borrowers with subprime
products on the basis of race, the borrowers were harmed by paying
significantly more than they would have otherwise, had they received the
prime loans to which they may have been entitled. Additionally, those
homeowners that defaulted on their mortgages due to the onerous terms and
conditions of those subprime loans and were subsequently foreclosed upon
can allege that but-for the reverse redlining to which they were subjected,
they would have neither paid significantly more for their homes, nor
suffered the emotional and financial trauma of foreclosure and eviction.
This theory of liability implicates much fewer of the innumerable economic
variables that Baltimore and Memphis’ complaints do.198 Separately, with
regard to directness of injury, Justice Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v.
Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co. made the following observation: “The
general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go
beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences to a

subprime mortgage securitizers.
196. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 269-70 (1992).
197. Cf. Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cv176, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303,
at *11 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 25, 2008) (stating that “the persons who were deceived by the
wrongful acts of the Defendants were not the Plaintiffs or proposed class members, but
rather the purchasers whose loan applications were falsified”).
198. See, e.g., Barrett v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-10157-RWZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30713 (D. Mass. Mar. 21, 2011) (certifying class of African American borrowers suing
H&R Block for lending and fair housing violations); Guerra v. GMAC LLC, No. 2:08-cv01297-LDD, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13776 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2009) (denying GMAC’s
motion to dismiss proposed class action alleging fair housing violations); Miller v.
Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008) (denying Countrywide’s
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss suit alleging racially motivated lending practices).
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defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suffered a
loss.”199 This restrictive rule remains good law, with circuit courts
referencing and applying it in various opinions within the RICO context.200
The wholly derivative nature of the municipalities’ injuries pushes toward
the conclusion that their harms, while real, fall into that category of indirect
injuries, which push toward a finding that standing is lacking.
As stated by the Baltimore, Birmingham and Cleveland courts,
innumerable causal factors stand between the loan officer’s initial decision
to target an African American borrower with a subprime loan, and the city
comptroller’s final report of significantly lowered property tax receipts.201
First, a foreclosure on the residential property must occur. This requires
the borrower to default, a decision that could occur for any number of
reasons independent of Wells Fargo’s reverse redlining, including illness in
the household, a layoff or the borrower’s voluntary default due to
significant negative equity in the property.202 Next, the bank must elect to
foreclose on the property.203 While that in and of itself may be sufficient to
199. S. Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918).
200. E.g., Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York, 130 S. Ct. 983 (2010) (ruling that
city failed to allege RICO violation because defendant’s purported mail and wire fraud
scheme was not direct cause of city’s lost tax revenue); Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v.
Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Holmes for proposition that a RICO action
to recover from derivative injuries is barred by remoteness principles); Adams-Lundy v.
Ass’n of Prof’l Flight Attendants, 844 F.2d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 1988) (dismissing plaintiffs’
RICO claims for failure to allege anything but indirect injuries); NCNB Nat’l Bank of N.C.
v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 937 (4th Cir. 1987) (dismissing derivative company stockholder’s
derivative RICO claim); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Justice
Holmes’s ‘tendency’—that the indirectly injured party may not sue—is equally wellestablished.”); Grip-Pak , Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1982)
(discussing tort principle of remoteness in the context of antitrust law); Nat’l Steel Corp. v.
Great Lakes Towing Co., 574 F.2d 339, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) (referencing Darnell-Taenzer in
negligent tort context); Drug Mart Pharmacy v. Am. Home Prods., 296 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (referencing Holmes in granting motion for partial summary judgment);
Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., No. 92 C 2379, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6141, at *7 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 1993) (stating that a plaintiff who complains of
injury derivative of third person’s harm suffered by defendant “generally stands at too
remote a distance to recover”); Milwaukee v. Universal Mortg. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 992
(E.D. Wis. 1988) (dismissing state RICO complaints because city did not suffer sufficiently
direct injury at hands of mortgage companies).
201. E.g., City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, Inc., No. CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123123 at *12 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009) (stating that “a series of speculative
inferences must be drawn to connect the injuries asserted with the alleged wrongful
conduct”).
202. See Tingley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303 at *11-12 (noting that borrowers could
have defaulted on their mortgages due to “unemployment, health problems, a general
weakening in the economy, or other financial conditions”).
203. Id. at *12 (emphasizing that a bank must make a conscious decision to foreclose on
the property, rather than attempt to restructure the loan).
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force prices downward on that property and surrounding properties, the
effect of reverse redlining on real estate values is inseparable from the
other economic forces acting simultaneously on local real estate markets.
During the years in which Wells Fargo engaged in reverse redlining, a
financial maelstrom swept the country. A financial crisis triggered broader
macroeconomic declines that worked to push house prices down across the
country. The spillover into the labor market impacted household
purchasing power, further crimping aggregate demand for real estate. The
grinding, decades-long deindustrialization of major American cities,
including Baltimore, did nothing to slow the free fall of real estate values.
This is to say nothing of the existing inner city decay that already wracked
these metropolitan areas, pushing more and more Americans into poverty.
With this many forces working to lower house prices, it becomes
impossible to say with any degree of certainty that a lender’s alleged
reverse redlining was even a partial contributor to the municipalities’
woes.204
Yet even once the last homeowner has been evicted and the “For Sale”
signs have been planted in the front yard, the banks were still not
responsible for the criminal actors who moved to exploit the new dead
zones that arose in the wake of the U.S. housing bubble. Squatters, of their
own volition, chose to move into properties. The drug dealers were the
ones who capitalized on abandoned properties to erect new open-air drug
markets.205 These are yet more links and independent actors in the causal
chain that produced the fiscal harms sued upon by Baltimore and
Memphis.206 By itself, the sheer indirectness of the cities’ injuries should
suffice to support a finding that they lack the standing to pursue FHA
claims against the lenders under the common law tests for antitrust and

204. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 850 (D.
Md. 2009) (noting complaint’s implausibility when considered “against the background of
other factors leading to the deterioration of the inner city, such as extensive unemployment,
lack of educational opportunity and choice, irresponsible parenting, disrespect for the law,
widespread drug use, and violence”); see also Kaing v. Pulte Homes, Inc., No. 09-5057 SC,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21320, at *17-18 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010) (“Plaintiff’s theory . . .
depends upon a chain of causation that is dependent upon many factors, ‘such as
unemployment, health problems, a general weakening economy, or other financial
conditions,’” and that “[a]ny injury suffered by Plaintiff . . . necessarily depends upon a
causal chain that includes numerous individual decisions of ‘some third part[ies] not before
the court.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Tingley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303 at *1112, and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
205. See City of Birmingham, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123123, at *13 (“The loss of tax
revenue from property taxes and the increase in spending, like the depreciation in home
values, could have been caused by any number of factors having nothing to do with the
Defendants’ alleged ‘reverse redlining.’”).
206. See id.
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RICO standing. The similarities between the plaintiffs’ causal theory in
these FHA cases and those in the firearm and tobacco litigation are simply
too great to ignore.207 A district court would be well within established
standing law to grant lenders’ 12(b)(1) motions, based on the sheer
indirectness of the cities’ theories of liability. However, for the sake of
completeness, I engage the rest of the Holmes and Associated General
tests.
As for the second element of the Holmes test, the estimated damages
sustained by Baltimore and Memphis are speculative at best and
unknowable at worst. The municipalities would have to demonstrate: (1)
how many minority borrowers would have taken out non-subprime loans
(or not taken out home loans at all) or chosen to refinance existing
mortgages, (2) whether those homeowners would still be in their homes in
the face of an array of wildly-fluctuating macroeconomic variables during a
global economic meltdown, and (3) whether the lenders’ alleged reverse
redlining practices were the primary culprits behind the foreclosures.208
The cities would have to estimate some realistic baseline scenario
consisting of what property tax receipts and municipal expenditures on the
relevant properties may have been in a world devoid of reverse redlining to
provide the courts with even an approximate sense of the damages. The
current complaints fail to supply any rough estimations of what savings
would have accrued to the cities were they not forced to expend sums of
money on maintaining and patrolling abandoned residential units. While
the Baltimore and Memphis complaints go into great detail about the
specific residential properties impacted by Wells Fargo’s alleged reverse
redlining and the municipal services extended to limit the urban fallout,
neither complaint provides a rough approximation of the savings that
would have accrued to the public fisc were the foreclosure wave averted.209
Although this kind of alternative financial scenario projection has never
been held necessary to show standing in an antitrust or RICO context, it
only solidifies the impression of “vast uncertainty” regarding the cities’
damages.210 Those who would argue that the cities have standing would
207. See supra note 131; see also City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768
N.E.2d 1136, 1151-56 (Ohio 2002) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (applying Holmes to conclude
that the issue of directness should preclude the court from finding that the city had standing
to sue Beretta).
208. See Tingley, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34303, at *11-12 (listing economic variables
that could plausibly have reduced the value of plaintiffs’ homes, including mortgagors’
default, banks’ decision to foreclose rather than restructure and deterioration of the regional
labor market).
209. See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4 (describing the city’s expenditures on
preserving vacant housing units).
210. Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 441 (3d Cir. 2000).
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likely cite the hedonic regressions offered by the city-plaintiffs in these
cases as sufficient to remove the uncertainty that shrouds the damages
alleged by plaintiffs. As this Comment later discusses, empirical estimates,
while helpful, should not be allowed to usurp the role reserved for judicial
intuition in gauging whether cities are the proper parties to bring suit.
Finally, the risk of double recoveries against the lenders is eminent
here. I concede that the damages sought by the cities here are proprietary
in nature: Foregone property tax receipts and the expenditures required to
keep large swathes of the cities from falling into disrepair. By definition,
the interests to be vindicated in these lawsuits are specific to the cities and
not to the now-foreclosed-upon homeowners.211 However, any damages
awarded to the cities for lost property tax receipts or forced municipal
expenditures would be necessarily contingent on calculations derived from
homeowners’ damages and reductions in the residential properties’
historical real estate value as impacted by the lenders’ reverse redlining
practices. Thus, “duplicate recoveries and apportionment are a real
concern.”212 Any recovery for the cities would necessarily be a result of
“complex rules for apportioning damages because there would be multiple
levels of injured plaintiffs.”213 Additionally, any damages inflicted by
Wells Fargo would have to be considered alongside potential reverse
redlining of other mortgage lenders doing business within city limits.214
Other lenders’ practices that resulted in foreclosure on residential units
adjacent to homes purchased with Wells Fargo loans could easily impact
the appraisal value of those properties, thus reducing the property tax
receipts received by cities on these Wells Fargo units. The lenders do not
operate in a vacuum; rather, their separate contributions to the housing
market bust would have to be carefully parsed and allocated simply to
prevent a double recovery for the same harm, but also for other lenders’
conduct, whether they were party to the litigation or not. Under the Holmes

The R.I. Laborers court noted the risks involved in holding that the plaintiff-fund had
standing: “Allowing suits by those injured only indirectly would open the door to ‘massive
and complex damages litigation . . . .’” R.I. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (D.R.I. 2000) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot.
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 274 (1992)).
211. See Engel, supra note 41, at 361 (stating that when cities “bring suits for damages
in their proprietary capacities, cities are acting to protect their own interests and must meet
the traditional Article III and prudential standing requirements”) (citing Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)).
212. Allegheny, 228 F.3d at 442.
213. R.I. Laborers, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
214. Cf. Camden Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp.
2d 245, 263-264 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[L]ogistical problems involved in apportioning damages
between the very distinct groups of defendants . . . tilts against a finding proximate cause.”).
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test, this militates against a finding of standing for the cities.
The cities fare no better under the six-pronged Associated General test
for antitrust standing. The first, fourth and fifth elements of the test,
focusing on the causal link between the lenders’ wrongdoing and plaintiffs’
harm and the speculative nature of damages, are replicated by the first and
second elements of the Holmes test. The second element of the Associated
General test, addressing defendants’ intent to harm the plaintiff, would
likely resolve in favor of the lenders.215 Even assuming that the banks
waged a systematic campaign to manipulate large segments of the African
American communities of Baltimore and Memphis into accepting subprime
loans, it is doubtful that the defendants did so with the specific goal of
injuring the municipal entities governing the cities. The third element asks
whether the injury sued upon relates to the congressional goals behind the
statute providing the cause of action.216 It is reasonable to presume that
suing to recover from economic losses sustained by race-based lending lies
within the realm of harms envisioned by the fair-lending laws. The sixth
and final elements are functionally identical to the third component of the
Holmes inquiry, and they resolve in the same manner.
Under either the antitrust or civil RICO test for standing, a court
would be hard-pressed to conclude that Baltimore’s and Memphis’
complaints, as currently formed, allege injuries “fairly traceable” to the
lenders’ conduct. Thus, I conclude that the cities should be found to lack
Article III standing to pursue their FHA claims against the lenders.
A. Response to Critics: If Cities Have Standing to Sue Under the
FHA, What Are the Limits?
My position on municipalities’ capacity to sue under the FHA could
be fairly construed as a narrow interpretation of existing standing law.217
However, if cities can be said to have Article III standing to sue under the
FHA for economic losses sustained due to lenders’ reverse redlining, who
is not amenable to FHA suits every time a municipality sustains a monetary
loss, any portion of which could conceivably be traced back to an action

215. See Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d
912, 924 (3d Cir. 1999) (describing the second element of Associated General as “the
specific intent of defendant to harm plaintiff”).
216. See id. (describing the third element of Associated General as “the nature of
plaintiff’s alleged injury . . . and whether it relates to the purpose of the antitrust laws”).
217. See discussion supra Part II (summarizing Engel’s and Brescia’s broad views of
standing and the latter’s argument that cities possess constitutional standing to sue under the
Fair Housing Act based on a generous standard of causation for municipality-sponsored
lawsuits).
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performed at any point in time by the defendant? I pose a few
hypotheticals to show the flaws inherent in this position.
Under the more liberal benchmark for Article III standing on FHA
claims espoused by the existing literature, the city of New York could sue
Wall Street investment banks for recklessly financing the subprime
mortgage markets after their shortsighted behavior resulted in economic
collapse, which in turn led to mass downsizing in the U.S. financial sector,
resulting in less taxable income, thereby forcing the city to scale back its
provision of essential services to residents.218 Like the local governments
at issue in this Comment, the City of New York would constitute an
aggrieved person under the FHA, because it was injured by statutory
violations.219 Thus, the city would be entitled to sue on this Rube
Goldberg-esque theory of liability, regardless of the number of links in the
causal chain. Any city that sustained a loss of tax revenue that could
theoretically be traced back to the bursting of the housing bubble would be
entitled to gain access to the federal courts through a direct suit against
financial institutions.
The converse of the immediate FHA litigation would also survive a
12(b)(1) motion under this generous standard for federal jurisdiction.
Where conventional redlining prevented otherwise qualified African
American borrowers from borrowing to purchase homes, city governments
would have lost a highly lucrative opportunity to benefit from the
residential real estate boom years of the early first decade of the twentyfirst century. By being denied the opportunity to partake in the frenzied
bubble years, cities were prevented from realizing increased property tax
revenues on properties subject to inflated prices. Similarly, sales tax
receipts were depressed as city residents were prevented from drawing on
the equity in their homes to fund consumption of household goods and
consumer durables. As a result, lenders’ redlining would have blocked
cities from funding expanded access to education for city residents,
increased police patrols through troubled neighborhoods, and improved
public infrastructure. Where the theory of liability is permitted to be
stretched to the breaking point and injuries are allowed to be calculated
using the help of economic counterfactuals, this level of permissiveness in
the pleadings means that the plaintiff’s ability to access the federal
courthouse is limited only by the attorney’s imagination.
There is no principled reason to limit the extreme flexibility of this
218. See Brescia, supra note 57, at 42 (“According to black letter law, when the
appropriate governmental body is seeking relief from a public nuisance, it need not plead
and prove special injury; rather, harm to the community is all it must show.”).
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i)(1) (2012) (defining an “[a]ggrieved person” as anyone
who “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice”).
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perspective on constitutional standing to suits by public entities. For
example, real estate developers would conceivably have a viable cause of
action against lenders under the existing literature’s approach. After the
banks engaged in reverse redlining while issuing subprime loans,
foreclosure waves wracked every major U.S. city. The subsequent erasure
of household net worth at the macro level put the realistic possibility of
homeownership beyond the reach of many Americans. As a result, real
estate developers realized reduced profits over the short and medium-run
due to lenders’ FHA violations.
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the infinitely elastic
nature of such an overly generous interpretation of standing jurisprudence.
Failing to set boundaries on standing would result in any municipality
gaining access to the courts merely by alleging economic loss that could
conceivably be traced back to an FHA violation, no matter how implausible
the theory or the number of intervening actors. Endorsement of such a
view on standing would leave the doctrine a hollow shell devoid of any
substance.
One response to this critique, as offered by the plaintiffs in Baltimore
and Memphis, is to employ statistical analysis to parse and quantify the
financial harm to the cities that could be directly attributable to reverse
redlining.220 Using econometric analysis, the plaintiffs can produce precise
estimations of the pecuniary damage created by the defendant lenders’
conduct. In the next section, I dispute the notion that regression analysis is
sufficient to cure this defect in the cities’ complaints.
B. Hedonic Regressions: Gutting the “Fairly Traceable” Analysis
For decades, the economics discipline has relied on complex
econometric analysis to conduct empirical research. Regression analysis is
the Swiss Army knife of modern economic research, allowing the user to
sift reams of data and piece together causal links between two or more
variables. The city-plaintiffs in Baltimore and Memphis, in fine-tuning
their pleadings to surmount the “fairly traceable” element of the standing
analysis, offered to present the results of hedonic regressions.221 They

220. See, e.g., Memphis Complaint, supra note 3, ¶ 201 (“Using a well-established
statistical regression technique that focuses on effects on neighboring properties, the City
and County have isolated the lost property value attributable to each individual foreclosure
or vacancy from losses attributable to other causes, such as neighborhood conditions.”).
221. See id.; see also Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 325 (“The loss in
assessed property value in the sub-neighborhoods caused by Wells Fargo’s unlawful acts
and consequent foreclosures can then be, and in significant measure has been, used to
calculate the City’s corresponding loss in property tax revenues.”).
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promised to separate with some degree of statistical certainty the precise
dollar impact of Wells Fargo’s purported reverse redlining practices.222
The cities’ ability to provide statistical estimates of the damage
inflicted by Wells Fargo and Citigroup’s purported reverse redlining should
trigger the same judicial skepticism that the pension funds and providers
received in the tobacco litigation. There, one court rejected the proffered
statistical modeling, saying that “we do not believe that aggregation and
statistical modeling are sufficient to get the Funds over the hurdle of the
[Associated General] factor focusing on whether the ‘damages claim . . . is
highly speculative.’”223
While the econometric analysis may prove capable of estimating the
fiscal effects of lenders’ FHA violations on city property values, if we wish
to keep standing doctrine alive, such analysis should be rejected by courts
as unsatisfactory for the purpose of alleging harm “fairly traceable” to
defendants’ conduct. To do otherwise is to fling the courthouse doors open
for any litigant who can afford the services of a halfway-competent
statistician. Furthermore, introducing regression analysis as a condition to
maintaining an FHA action effectively transforms the motion to dismiss
stage into a battle of the econometricians, as plaintiff and defendant grapple
over the robustness of plaintiff’s econometric model, theoretical
assumptions and the quality of empirical data. This would be tantamount
to judicial ceding of the standing inquiry to the economists. Just as courts
are cautioned to know the limits of judicial competence, so should they be
aware of what lies well within the juridical domain.224 Courts should reject
as inadequate the cities’ furnishing of empirical data to satisfy the “fairly

222. See Baltimore 3d Complaint, supra note 4, ¶ 326 (“Application of hedonic
regression to data regularly maintained by Baltimore permits precise quantification of the
injury to the City caused by Defendants’ discriminatory lending practices and resulting
foreclosures in sub-neighborhoods where Wells Fargo foreclosures constitute at least onethird of all foreclosures.”).
223. R.I. Laborers’ Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 174,
186 (D.R.I. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting Steamfitters Local Union No. 420
Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, 171 F.3d 912, 929 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Allegheny Gen.
Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 442 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting plaintiff-hospitals’
argument that the court “can calculate damages through aggregation and statistical
modeling” because “speculative calculations create a vast uncertainty about the Hospitals’
damages, and leads us to question whether a remediable injury exists”).
224. Compare Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (applying a multifactor test
to measure “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion” to hold that political gerrymandering was a political
question, foreclosing the possibility of judicial intervention), with Ungar v. PLO, 402 F.3d
274 (1st Cir. 2005) (using Baker v. Carr’s multifactor test for justiciability to find that
political question doctrine did not bar court from hearing case) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962)).
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traceable” component of the Article III standing inquiry.
V.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE IMPLICATIONS OF
CITIES’ LACK OF ARTICLE III STANDING TO SUE UNDER THE
FHA

The result I reach is an unhappy one: Assuming the foregoing
analysis is correct, who is left to seek judicial redress for the harms
inflicted on cities and homeowners by mortgage lenders’ practices? Class
actions on behalf of homeowners victimized by reverse redlining are a
potential solution. However, the national mortgage settlement, as expected,
largely absolves the mortgage providers from “certain violations of civil
law based on the banks’ mortgage loan servicing activities . . . .”225 While
individual litigants remain generally free to bring claims, the near-total
release from civil liability as relating to enforcement actions brought by
state attorneys general and federal regulators is staggering in its breadth.226
Depending on the vagaries of state law, cities may also be able to sue in
their respective jurisdictions’ courts under state law causes of action.227
Article III’s standing requirements are limited to those plaintiffs that seek
to invoke the federal judicial power.228
But make no mistake: I do not argue that the lenders were not largely
responsible for much of the financial upheaval that has wracked the nation
in the last several years. The housing boom provided us with no shortage
of horror stories detailing the consequences of banks’ often times reckless,
exploitative and illegal lending policies from the last several years.229 This

225. Fact Sheet: Mortgage Servicing Agreement, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT,
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_
Settlement/Mortgage_Servicing_Settlement_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2012).
226. Id. at 4.
227. The likelihood of success on this approach is uncertain. See Engel, supra note 41,
at 365 (“Only a handful of jurisdictions have reported decisions addressing municipal
standing as quasi-sovereigns, leaving most cities in the dark about their ability to bring such
claims.”).
228. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“The party invoking
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”).
229. E.g., Joshua Rhett Miller, Bank of America to Pay Florida Couple in Mistaken
Foreclosure Case, FOX NEWS (June 6, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/06/bankamerica-pays-florida-couple-in-mistaken-foreclosure-case/ (“Bank of America mistakenly
filed a foreclosure claim against the couple despite the absence of a mortgage, prompting
the Nyergeses to take the matter to court. The couple eventually won, but then asked Bank
of America to pay for $2,534 in attorney fees. A Collier County judge ruled the bank
should pay, but the bank never did.”); Franco Ordonez, Major Banks Possibly Foreclosed
Illegally on Military Personnel, DENVER POST (Dec. 1, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.
denverpost.com/business/ci_19444085.
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is to say nothing of the array of other reprehensible activities that they have
engaged in, wholly separate from predatory lending.230 This Comment
addresses the jurisdictional barrier to cities’ recovery, not the merits of
their complaints. But even assuming that no one will be left to seek
judicial redress for lenders’ reverse redlining practices, that in itself does
not justify a finding of municipal standing to sue, simply to “Make
Everything Come Out Right.”231 Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and subject-matter jurisdiction is distinctive in that it is the
only basis that courts can use to justify sua sponte dismissal of a case.232
The paramount importance of preserving courts’ traditional role in our
representative democracy mandates deference to the historical standing
doctrine, along with acknowledgment that cities’ inability to sue lenders
under the FHA is symptomatic of their marginal role in the federal
system.233 Perhaps this is a feature, not a bug.
To reiterate, the standing inquiry exists to carefully circumscribe the
court’s role in a democratic society. To prevent the judiciary from falling
into the habit of regularly issuing judgments on abstract questions of public
policy, standing imposes upon plaintiffs the burden of demonstrating “a
‘personal stake in the outcome’ . . . to ‘assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues necessary for the proper

230. Jeff Horwitz, Bank of America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty
Records, 177 AMERICAN BANKER 62 (Mar. 30, 2012) (detailing Bank of America’s sale of
credit card receivables, despite incomplete and inaccurate records documenting consumers’
debts); Jeff Horwitz, OCC Probing JPMorgan Chase Credit Card Collections, 177 AM.
BANKER 40 (Mar. 14, 2012) (describing “procedural shortcuts” and “faulty account records”
used to sue thousands of delinquent credit card borrowers); William Selway & Martin Z.
Braun, Wells Fargo Pays $148 Million to Settle Wachovia Muni Bid-Rigging Charges,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-08/wellsfargo-pays-148-million-to-settle-wachovia-muni-bid-rigging-charges.html; William Selway
et al, Jefferson County, Alabama, Votes to Declare Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-1109/alabama-s-jefferson-county-votes-for-biggest-municipal-bankruptcy-in-u-s-.html
(describing “[t]wo former JPMorgan bankers [who] are fighting Securities and Exchange
Commission charges that they made $8 million in undisclosed payments to friends of
commissioners to secure the bank’s role” in interest rate swaps that moved against Jefferson
County, resulting in the county’s declaring Chapter 9 bankruptcy).
231. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 576 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. See Gilmore v. Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 11-12747, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS
2237, at *2-3 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (stating that federal courts are obligated to determine
whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, sua sponte); Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405
F.3d 964, 975 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “it is well settled that a federal court is obligated
to inquire into the existence of subject matter jurisdiction”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3)
(mandating that federal courts dismiss any action where the court determines that subjectmatter jurisdiction is lacking).
233. See Schragger, supra note 82, at 2576.
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resolution of constitutional questions.’”234 As Chief Justice Roberts
observed in Massachusetts v. EPA, “standing jurisprudence simply
recognizes that redress of [certain types of] grievances . . . ‘is the function
of Congress and the Chief Executive,’ not the federal courts.”235 Standing
evolved out of a need to prevent the federal courts from becoming the
default mechanism by which public policy disputes were resolved, rather
than the political branches.
The questions of how to resolve the financial crisis of the last few
years, who to blame, and what types of punishments are to be meted out are
best reserved to the executive and legislative branches. Those domains
have, by their actions, made a conscious political decision to sanction the
worst excesses of the boom years, including unethical, dangerous, and
illegal activity at the highest echelons of Wall Street, to preserve financial
stability and a still-ongoing economic recovery. The elected officials
accountable to us have made this judgment call. As subordinate players in
the federal system, cities should not be permitted to undermine that
political decision, however flawed and shortsighted, by waging their own
wars against the banks in the federal judiciary, whether on their own behalf
or on behalf of resident taxpayers.
CONCLUSION
There is no serious dispute as to the culpability of banks, mortgage
lenders and all other financial actors complicit in the largest financial crisis
in the post-war era. Nonetheless, this does not absolve federal courts of the
responsibility to ensure that jurisdictional requirements are satisfied before
hearing disputes between two parties. “The constitutional role of the
courts . . . is to decide concrete cases—not to serve as a convenient forum
for policy debates.”236 The dilution or destruction of a longstanding
judicial doctrine fashioned to preserve the constitutional separation of
powers is too heavy a price to pay so that municipalities may make an end
run around our non-functioning political branches. Allowing cities to wage
a political battle in the judicial arena would only work to damage the
integrity of the federal court system. Such an outcome would be infinitely
more harmful in the long run than the urban blight sustained by those
municipalities.
234. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
235. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 535 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)).
236. Id. at 547 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).

